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I. Introduction
Entrapment is as old as a pleasant garden, a forbidden fruit, and a
fallen angel. “The serpent beguiled me, and I did eat,” pleaded Eve in
response to an accusing Lord God.1 Early English cases report
instances of citizens being lured into crime so they might be
apprehended.2 Nineteenth century American cases similarly record
examples of persons tempted to illegality for the purpose of subjecting
them to criminal sanctions.3 Entrapment as a social occurrence has
long been with us.
In contrast, entrapment as a legal defense is of relatively recent
mint. Under the defense, a person may not be convicted of a crime if
he has been encouraged to commit it by a government agent under the
appropriate circumstances. The doctrine’s genesis is generally traced
to a series of United States Supreme Court opinions starting in the
1930s.4 These opinions broke with the traditional view that it was
legally irrelevant how the criminal was led to temptation.5 Following
1

Genesis 3:13 (King James).
See Regina v. Holden, 127 Eng. Rep. 1107 (Cr. Cas. Res. 1810) (bank
agents solicit defendants to purchase forged notes); Regina v. Titley, Cox Crim. Cas.
526, 12 J.P 776 (Cent. Crim. 1848) (undercover police officer convinces chemist to
sell aborticide); Regina v. Bickley, 2 Crim. App. R. 53, 73 J.P. 239 (C.C.A. 1909)
(same).
3
See People v. Mills, 70 N.E. 786 (1904) (undercover police officer provides
indictments for defendant to steal); Board of Commissioners v. Backus, 29 How. Pr.
33 (NY Sup. Ct. 1864) (defendant sells liquor without licence to police agents and
then is sued for penalty); President of the Town of St. Charles v. O’Mailey, 18 Ill 407
(1857) (same).
4
See Sorrels v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932); United States v. Russell, 411
U.S. 423 (1937); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 435 (1958). Cf. Casey v. United
States, 276 U.S. 413, 421-25 (1928) (Brandeis, J. dissenting; willing to recognized
defense). These cases, of course, were not without harbingers. In the 1920s, lower
courts had occasionally grasped and applied the underlying principles of entrapment
as a defense. See Rebecca Roiphe, The Serpent Beguiled Me: A History of the
Entrapment Defense, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 257, 278-85 (2003); see also Michael
A. DeFeo, Entrapment as a Defense to Criminal Responsibility: Its History, Theory
and Application, 1 U. SAN. FRAN. L. REV. 243, 248 (1967) (identifying Saunders v.
People, 38 Mich. 218 (1878), as earlier United States entrapment case). Nevertheless,
the United States Supreme Court, in the decisions cited above, stamped it with an
unassailable seal of approval and put the defense on the national map.
5
See Roiphe, supra note 4 at 270 (“No state or federal court recognized
entrapment as a valid defense prior to 1870.”); WAYNE LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW, 450
2
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the Supreme Court’s lead, virtually every jurisdiction in the United
States has adopted a version of the defense.6 Based on its brief history
and wide reception, entrapment has strong claim to being the newest
inductee into the criminal law’s pantheon of defenses.7
The fact that entrapment was for so long unrecognized as grounds
for exoneration suggests that its rationale is not obvious. Indeed, a
moment’s consideration reveals the defense to be positively perplexing.
Consider these scenarios:
Jacob is a 56-year-old farmer. He orders by
mail a magazine of photographs of nude boys at
a time when such materials could by legally
ordered. Subsequently, over a two-and-a-half
year period, he receives unsolicited mailing
from five organizations such as “The American
Hedonist Society,” which purport to oppose
censorship of pornography and support sexual
freedom. Although Jacob does not place an
order for child pornography with one such
organization that contacts him through the mail,
through a second he orders a magazine entitled
(2000 3d. ed.) (“[A]s a historical matter, the traditional response of the law was that
there were no limits upon the degree of temptation to which law enforcement officers
and their agents could subject those under investigation.”). To this day, the defense
of entrapment is generally not recognized in England. See PAUL MARCUS, THE
ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE 2 (1995 2d ed.).
6
See MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.13 cmt. at 407 (Official
Draft and Revised Comments 1985) (“[T]he defense of entrapment has been almost
universally recognized in the United States.”). Twenty-five states have adopted
entrapment statutes. See MARCUS, supra note 5, ch. 12 (listing statutes). The
remaining states and the federal system have judicially-created entrapment defenses.
7
Though widely discussed, the battered woman syndrome defense is not wellestablished. While expert testimony concerning the psychological aspects of abusive
relationships is usually admissible, see Bechtel v. State, 840 P.2d 1 (Oak. Crim. App.
1992) (collecting cases from other jurisdictions), it is not clear that battered woman
syndrome is properly described as a “new” defense. Some suggest it is best
conceived of as a subcategory of self-defense, see Alafair S. Burke, Rational Actors,
Self-Defense, and Duress: Making Sense, Not Syndromes, Out of the Battered
Woman, 81 N. CARO. L. REV. 207 (2002), and others suggest it is best conceived of a
subcategory of duress, see Laurie Kratky Dore, Downward Adjustment and the
Slippery Slope: The Use of Duress in the Defense of Battered Offenders, 56 OHIO ST.
L. J. 665 (1995).
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“Boys Who Love Boys.” Jacob is subsequently
arrested for possessing sexually explicit
depictions of children.
Ken is desperately in need of money. He
approaches Rocky for a loan. Rocky refuses,
but convinces Ken, who has no history of drug
use, to join a drug transaction. Ken and Rocky
drive to a highway intersection where they meet
Willy. Willy gives Ken $300. Willy and Ken
agree to meet later that day to complete the
transaction. Ken reluctantly accepts a bag
containing three grams of cocaine from Rocky.
Rocky, Ken and Willy later meet in a parking
lot. When Ken gives Willy the bag, he is
arrested and charged with dealing in cocaine.
Rich runs an ongoing yard sale. One day at
the yard sale, he is approached by Dale. Dale
offers him $200 worth of food stamps for an
electric typewriter. When Rich declines, Dale
asks him if he would be interested in purchasing
the food stamps. Rich, who enjoys bartering,
offers Dale $30, and they shortly agree on $35.
Next month, Rich is again approached by Dale,
and Rich agrees to buy $870 worth of food
stamps for $140.
Rich is charged with
unauthorized use of food stamps.
On these facts, Jacob, Ken and Rich will almost certainly be guilty as
charged and face significant periods of incarceration. Indeed, their
cases might be considered all too common examples of how persons
come to step over the line into illegality and become first-time
offenders. Now, however, add the facts that (1) the organizations that
contacted Jacob were fictitious ones created by a unit within the Postal
Service; (2) Rocky is an informant and Willy is an undercover police
officer, and (3) Dale is an undercover police officer. With these
additional facts, Jacob, Ken, and Rich will very likely be able to
establish the entrapment defense and avoid all liability.8
8

The three entrapment scenarios presented above are based on Jacobson v.
United States, 112 S. Ct. 1535 (1992); Kats v. Indiana, 559 N.E.2d 348 (Ct. Apps.
Ind. 1990), and People v. Boalbey, 493 N.E.2d 369 (App. Ct. Ill. 1986),
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Why should Jacob, Ken and Rich now escape criminal sanctions?
As a doctrinal matter, the government’s role in the crimes, either as
instigator or tempter, is the critical element triggering the operation of
the defense. In order for a defendant to establish the entrapment
defense, a government agent must be the tempter or inducer.9 This fact,
however, appears to have no bearing on the personal blameworthiness
of Jacob, Ken and Rich. After all, as far as they knew, they were
dealing with private citizens. Subjectively they appear to share the
same culpable states of mind as their hypothetical counterparts who
correctly believed they were dealing with private citizens and who
would be convicted. In both the actual and hypothetical cases, the
temptations should have been resisted. Likewise, it appears that Jacob,
Ken, and Rich are no less dangerous to society by virtue of the
government’s role in their crimes. Their dispositions to crime are
equally well confirmed regardless of whether those they are interacting
with are employed by the government or are private citizens. Since
punishment is generally considered appropriate for those who have
manifested their dangerousness through blameworthy conduct
prohibited the criminal law, it seems equally appropriate for Steve, Ken
and Rich. Finally, some police activities that arguably crime control
are objectionable on public policy grounds.
For example,
10
unconstitutional searches and seizures,
even if morally
unobjectionable when used against criminals,11 are never permitted
because they carry an unacceptable risk of being used against citizens
who can rightly object to them. However, it is unclear on what basis
other citizens could object to the type of actions employed against
Jacob, Ken, and Rich, as persons should be able to resist the
respectively. In all three cases, entrapment was found to be established as a matter of
law. Entrapment as a matter of law is a very demanding standard, appropriate only
where the existence of entrapment is indisputable.
The scenarios above,
consequently, represent clear cases of entrapment.
9
See MARCUS, THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE, supra note 5, §§ 4.02 & 5.10. A
more detailed statement of the requirements of the entrapment defense is presented in
Part II, infra.
10
See U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV.
11
Persons, it might be argued, as a matter of morality forfeit rights to privacy and
liberty upon engaging in culpable illegal conduct. This fact appears dimly recognized
in the constitutional doctrine that a person has no legitimate privacy interest in the
nondisclosure of illegal activity. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 12224 (1984) (holding use of field test to identify substance as cocaine not a search).
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temptations offered in those cases. Why then permit the plea of
entrapment?
Entrapment has been described as a defense “buffeted by
conflicting interpretations.”12 This Article attempts to advance a new
and superior interpretation by focusing on the relevancy of the
entrapper’s governmental status. First, the article presents the basic
contours of the doctrine. Second, it reviews a variety of theories of
entrapment and exposes their shortcomings as explanations for why the
entrapped should be exonerated. Third, the Article introduces and
defends a new theory of entrapment–entrapment as unfairness.
According to this theory, entrapment is neither an excuse, a
justification, nor a public policy defense, as those categories have
traditionally been understood. Rather, entrapment is fatally unfair to its
target in the following sense: For society to impose criminal sanctions
on an entrapped person would be to place on her a disproportionate
share of the cost of general crime prevention and control, violating the
well-established norm of distributive justice that, to the extent possible,
the cost of an activity should be shared among all its beneficiaries.
After elaborating this thesis, the Article considers and responds to a
number of potential objections to entrapment as unfairness. Finally, the
Article applies the theory to a number of current controversies
concerning entrapment.
II. The Law of Entrapment
Any exposition of the law of entrapment must begin with the fact
that the doctrine has two versions. The first version is the subjective
version; the second is the objective version. As discussed below,
although they are distinct in structure and content, they overlap
significantly in application.
A. Basics of the Subjective Version
The subjective version of the entrapment defense is followed in
the federal courts and in a substantial majority of the states.13
Commonly it is judicially created and lacks a statutory formulation.14
12

GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 542 (1978).
In Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540 (1992), the Supreme Court
reaffirmed its commitment to the subjective approach. Id. at 548-49. Most states
have adopted the subjective approach.
See MODEL PENAL CODE AND

13
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The subjective version of the defense has a two-part structure. In
most courts employing the subjective version, a defendant wishing to
assert entrapment must first establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that a government agent “induced” him to commit the crime
he is charged with.15 If he is unsuccessful, the defense fails. If the
defendant is successful in carrying this burden, the burden shifts to the
government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was
“predisposed” to commit the crime.16 If the government carries its
burden, demonstrating predisposition, the defense fails. However, if at
this point the government fails to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the induced defendant was predisposed, the defense succeeds and the
defendant is acquitted on the ground of entrapment.
In practice, it is relatively easy for the defendant to satisfy the
first part of the test. “Inducement” has been defined expansively as
“soliciting, proposing, initiating, broaching or suggesting the
commission of the offense charged.”17 It is clearly that inducement
requires more than merely the furnishing of an opportunity for crime.18
An offer to purchase drugs at market price, for example, is not an
inducement.19 Nor does inducement require that the government
agent’s conduct caused the defendant to commit the crime; rather it
merely requires that the conduct “could have caused an indisposed
COMMENTARIES, supra note 6, § 409 n.9 (providing examples). Only about a dozen
states have opted for the alternative objective approach. See infra note 41.
14
Federal courts, lacking the power to create either substantive criminal laws or
defenses, have determined that, in enacting various criminal offense, Congress
intended that those entrapped not be convicted. See Sorrells v. United States, 287
U.S. 435, 446-48 (1932). As Park notes, whatever the plausibility of this
determination with respect to early statutes used to prosecute the entrapped, “there is
nothing extraordinary in assuming that Congress intends its [latter] enactments to be
subject to the entrapment defense, just as they are subject other common law defense
(such as insanity and duress).” Roger Park, The Entrapment Controversy, 60 MINN.
L. REV. 163, 247 (1976).
15
See MARCUS, THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE, supra note 5, § 6.05. Some
jurisdictions accept a lesser evidentiary showing. Id.
16
See id. § 6.07.
17
United States v. Sherman, 200 F.2d 880, 883 (2d Cir. 1952) (Hand, J.). Accord
United States v. Dunn, 779 F.2d 157, 158 (2d Cir.1985).
18
See United Sates v. Bibbey, 735 F.2d 619, 621-22 (1st Cir. 1984); United
States v. Randolph, 738 F.2d 244 (8th Cir. 1984); State v. Kotwitz, 549 So.2d 351,
357 (La. App. 1989).
19
See, e.g., Ruggs v. State, 601 So.2d 508, 511 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992).
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person to commit the crime.”20 Significantly, there is no formal
requirement the inducement offered by the government rise to a
particular level of persuasiveness or pressure.21
For example,
entrapment has been found where a 1930s prohibition agent, after
establishing that he and the defendant had served in the same army
division, merely made repeated requests for illegal liquor to the
defendant.22 Likewise, entrapment has been found based merely on
repeated requests for narcotics by an acquaintance claiming to need
them to assuage his addition.23 Rather than focusing on the conduct of
the tempter, the requirement of inducement in practice seems to focus
on the status of the tempter.24 Only government inducement will
qualify a defendant for entrapment.25 Where the government has
played no significant role, the question of a predisposition need not
arise. The requirement of inducement acts as a gate-keeping measure
for the real ball game in entrapment litigation: the question of a
predisposition.
Whether a person is predisposed is based on the person’s
disposition prior to his first contact with government agents.26 The
question is whether, at that point, he was “ready and willing” to commit
the crime “whenever the opportunity was afforded.”27 Such a query is
unusual. Traditionally, the criminal law has shied away from the direct
inquiry whether a person is predisposed to criminality. It has been
thought that findings of a criminal predisposition, that is, propensity for
20

United States v. Kelly, 748 F.2d 691, 691 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
United States v. Licursi, 525 F.2d 1164, 1168 (2d Cir. 1975) (inducement
involves only “‘the Government’s initiation of the crime and not . . . the degree of
pressure exerted’”) (citing United States v. Riley, 363 F.2d 955, 958 (2d Cir., 1966)).
22
See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 439-40 (1932).
23
See Sherman v. United States, 365 U.S.369, 370-71 (1958).
24
See United States v. Borum, 584 F.2d 424, 427 (C.A.D.C.,1978) (“While
predisposition is the key issue, it does not totally subsume the question of
inducement, for separate consideration of the inducement issue illuminates one
critical, additional element of the entrapment defense: instigation of the criminal act
by government agent.”).
25
See MARCUS, THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE, supra note 5, § 8.03 (citing, inter
alia, United States v. Manzella, 791 F.2d 1263, 1269 (7th Cir. 1986) (“There is no
defense of private entrapment.”)).
26
See Jacobson, 500 U.S. at 549 (holding that predisposition must exist not only
prior to inducement, but prior to government contact).
27
Id.
21

ANTHONY M. DILLOF

9

crime before any crime has been attempted, could not be made with
sufficient reliability to warrant the imprisonment of those so
identified.28 Dangerous people, of course, must be identified and
incapacitated. Yet rather than predicating liability on a predisposition
alone, the criminal law has favored the establishment of inchoate
offenses, such as attempt and conspiracy. Liability for these offenses
requires a finding of criminal intent.29 Intent implies a conscious state
of mind,30 rather than merely a disposition, which is simply a tendency,
or potential, to respond to a stimulus. Furthermore, inchoate offenses
generally include an “overt act” requirement to supplement and bolster
the finding of criminal intent.31 Entrapment thus presents a stark
exception to the general reluctance to inquire directly about a criminal
propensity.
The existence of a predisposition is in most cases a question of
fact for the jury. In reviewing jury findings of a predisposition, courts
have identified a number of factors relevant to whether predispositions
to the offense charge existed: (1) the character or reputation of the
defendant, including any prior criminal record; (2) whether the
government initially suggested the criminal activity; (3) whether the
defendant engaged in the crime for profit; (4) the nature of the
government inducement; and, most importantly, (5) whether the
defendant expressed reluctance to commit the crime which had to be
overcome through repeated government inducement.32
Although theoretically distinct, in practice inquiries into the
existence of inducement and predisposition often overlap. Factors (2),
(4) and (5) relate directly to possible actions of the government in
encouraging the crime. This overlap should be no surprise. The
28

See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING REPORT at
32 (April 11, 2003) (“Much research on selective incapacitation has been performed
since 1962, and the brunt of the findings is that it is difficult to predict future serious
criminal behavior with acceptable levels of accuracy.”)
29
See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 5.01(1), 5.03(1)& (b); LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW,
supra note 5, §§ 11.3, 12.2(3).
30
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a) & (b); LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 5.2.
31
See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 5.01(2) (requiring act that strongly corroborates
actor’s criminal intent), 5.03(5) (requiring overt act for conspiracy unless conspiracy
to engage in felony of first or second degree); LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 5,
§§ 11.4, 12.2.
32
See United States v. Smith, 802 F.2d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 1986).
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entrapment defense is commonly raised in circumstances where the
defendant has indisputably committed a criminal act.33 This act itself
implies the existence of a predisposition since in most cases, those who
commit criminal acts were disposed to do so. The government in effect
relies on an overt act after the inducement to demonstrate
predisposition at the time of the inducement.34 The strength of such an
inference naturally varies inversely with the strength of the inducement.
The weaker the inducement, the greater the need to posit a
predisposition to crime to explain the defendant’s act, and the stronger
the inference to predisposition.35 Therefore, while there is no formal
requirement that the inducement be particularly powerful in order to
establish the defense, only where it is strong will the defendant be able
to avoid the inference to predisposition, defeating his claim.
Other issues concerning the scope of the defense have not been
clearly resolved. For example, should a defendant be entitled to the
defense in cases where he desired to commit the offense charged, but
where, but for the government’s involvement, it is clear that he would
not have? For example, D wants to counterfeit money, but is
completely without the resources to do so before government agents
supply D with the necessary equipment.36 Likewise, should the
defendant be considered predisposed to a criminal act if he has some
identifiable desire to engage in it, but has deeply embedded character
traits that would, but for government action, have constrained him from
engaging in the act?37 Finally, how similar must be the crime actually
33

In order to raise the entrapment defense, a defendant need not concede prima
facie liability. Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58 (1988). Nevertheless, because
of the government’s first-hand involvement in the events leading to the arrest, the
evidence that the defendant engaged in prohibited conduct is usually strong and often
uncontested.
34
See Harrison v. State, 442 A.2d 1377, 1379-80 (Del. 1982) (court explains
relevancy of defendant’s response to inducement to predisposition.) Kadis v. United
States, 373 F.2d 370, 373 (1sr Cir. 1967). See Roger Park, The Entrapment
Controversy, 60 MINN. L. REV. 163, 200 (1976).
35
See Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 550 (stating in typical case, defense of little use
because “the ready commission of the criminal act amply demonstrates the
defendant’s predisposition”).
36
See text accompanying notes 203-207, infra.
37
This issue is raised in Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 559-60 (suggesting that
government’s overcoming a person’s tendency to respect the law should not be
equating with creating predisposition).
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committed and the crime intended? For example, if it is found that the
defendant planned to sell one quantity or type of contraband on a
particular occasion to a particular class of person, and was induced to
sell a very/somewhat/slightly different quantity or type of contraband,
on another occasion to a person of another class, should he be entitled
to the entrapment defense?38
B. Basics of the Objective Version
The objective version of the defense is simpler in structure that
the subjective version. The central issue is simply whether the
government’s conduct creates a substantial risk that such an offense
will be would be committed by “persons other than those ready to
commit it”39 or alternatively, by “normally law-abiding citizens.”40
These formulations of the defense, found respectively in the Model
Penal Code and the Brown Draft of a New Federal Criminal Code, have
been the basis for entrapment defenses adopted by decision or statute in
about a dozen states.41 In such jurisdictions, the defendant bears the
burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence the existence
of the substantial risk.
38

In federal court, the jury is asked whether the crime the defendant was
predisposed to commit was “of the character” actually committed. Beyond that, one
scholar has commented, the matter is considered “quintessential[ly] [a] jury issue.”
Park, The Entrapment Controversy, supra note 14, at 178.
39
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13(2).
40
Final Report of the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal
Laws, Proposed New Federal Criminal Code § 702 (1971).
41
MARCUS, THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE, supra note 5 at 169. See , e.g., Ark.
Code Ann. § 5-2-209 (1987) (“Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement officer . . .
induces the commission of an offense by using persuasion or other means likely to
cause normally law_abiding persons to commit the offense.”); Utah Code Ann. § 762-303 (“Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement officer . . . induces the
commission of an offense . . .by methods creating a substantial risk that the offense
would be committed by one not otherwise ready to commit it.”). In addition, a
defense based on outrageous governmental conduct in instigating criminal activity
exists under the Due Process Clause. See MARCUS, THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE,
supra note 5, ch. 7. This defense resembles the objective version of entrapment
insofar as it can be established based solely on governmental conduct; the defendant’s
disposition is irrelevant. Id. at 291. The primary difference between the two is that
in order to establish the Due Process defense, a much greater degree of control,
entanglement, and overreaching must be show. See Kenneth M. Lord, Entrapment
and Due Process: Moving Toward a Dual System of Defenses, FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
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In contrast to the subjective version of the defense, the
defendant’s characteristics, including any predisposition to crime, are
irrelevant. The focus of the inquiry is how the police conduct at issue
may affect a member of the public in the abstract, not the defendant in
particular.42 Of course, it is necessary for the defendant to show that
the police conduct actually targeted him or might have caused the
conduct.43 For example, there still would be liability for criminal
conduct occurring before the improper police conduct. 44 Examples of
government conduct found to have violated the objective standard
include appealing to a close personal relationship with the defendant,45
forming a sexual relationship with the defendant,46 and offering
excessive amounts of money.47 There is also a significant procedural
difference between the two versions of the defense. Unlike the
subjective test, the objective test is typically a matter for the court, not
the jury, to apply, with the defendant shouldering the burden of proof.48
463, 505 (1998). Because Due Process entrapment claims are subsumed by the
objective version of the entrapment defense, they present no novel issues, and shall
not be discussed specifically by this Article.
42
It may be argued that even standard objective formulation does not allow of the
acquittal of a defendant who was dead set on committing the offense. The Model
Penal Code, for example, defines “unlawful entrapment” as conduct by which an
officer “induces or encourages another person” to commit the charged offense. Id. at
§ 2.13(1). “Induces” suggests a causal relation between the action of the police and
the criminal conduct of the defendant. A person who was going to engage in conduct
anyway might not be said to be induced to it. If inducement was required, a relatively
weak subjective component would be included in the MPC test. “Encourages,” the
other term employed, however, does not necessarily imply a causal relation.
Encouragement to act may be given to a person who does not need it because she was
going to act anyway. If encouragement by the police is all that is necessary, the MPC
formulation is wholly objective.
43
See People v. Crawford, 372 N.W.2d 550, 552 (Mich. App. 1985).
44
See Municipality of Anchorage v. Flanagan, 649 P.2d 956 (Alaska. App.
1982).
45
See, e.g, Commonwealth v. Lucci, 662 A.2d 1 (Sup. Ct. Pa. 1995); Dial v.
Florida, 799 So.2d 407 (Ct. App. Fla. 2001); Michigan v. Soper, 226 N.W.2d 691 (Ct.
App. Mich. 1975); Montana v. Kamrud, 611 P.2d 188 (Mont. 1980).
46
People v. Wisneski, 292 N.W.2d 196 (Mich. App. 1980).
47
See, e.g., Grossman v. State, 457 P.2d 226, 230 (Ala. 1969).
48
See MARCUS, THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE, supra note 5, at 85 n.20, 183;
M.P.C. § 2.13(2). The objective test is essentially a test of the propriety of police
conduct. Advocates of the objective test thus placed it in the hands of the courts on
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A common problem arises in applying the objective version of
entrapment. In order to determine the effect of the government’s
conduct on hypothetical persons who are not ready to commit the
offense (or hypothetical law-abiding citizens), the court must decide
what features the hypothetical person has. For example, where a
recovering drug addict claims she was entrapped, should the court
consider the effect of the government conduct on an ordinary person
who is not ready to commit the crime, or recovering drug addict who is
not ready to commit the crime? The choice may make a difference in
the outcome of the test. A recovering drug addict may be likely to
respond to certain government encouragement to possess drugs where a
person who was not addicted might not be likely to when faced with the
same conduct.49 In other contexts where the behavior of a hypothetical
person is relevant to determining the defendant’s liability, the Model
Penal Code has opted for partial relativization by asking what an
average person “in the actor’s situation” would do.50 Such a
formulation would be broad enough to allow, but not require, the jury
to consider the effect of the government’s conduct on those who have
an above-average disposition toward crime, such as drug users, even if
they are not ready to commit the offense.
C. Relation of the Subjective and Objective Versions
At this stage, subjective and objective versions of the entrapment
defense may be usefully compared. On the formal level, both versions
have a critical hypothetical component. Under the subjective version,
the prosecution may be required to establish the defendant’s criminal
disposition. To assert a person, P, has a disposition to do X is to assert
that if certain hypothetical conditions obtained, P would do X. Under
the objective test, the defendant must show the effect of the police
conduct on a hypothetical law-abiding actor. The critical questions of
each version of the defense neatly compare as follows:

the ground that, while juries properly judged defendants, only courts should judge the
police. See United States v. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 457 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
49
See Park, The Entrapment Controversy, supra note 14, at 204 (“An agent’s
knowledge that his target has a weakness for a vice crime but is currently abstaining
is surely a fact that merits consideration when assessing the agent’s conduct.”)
50
See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 210.3(1)(b), 2.02(2)(d) (manslaughter and
negligent conduct).
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Subjective – Would the crime have likely
occurred if the defendant had been placed in a
hypothetical set of circumstances without the
police agent’s excessive encouragement toward
crime?
Objective – Would the crime have likely
occurred if the police agent had been placed in
a hypothetical set of circumstances without the
defendant’s excessive inclination toward crime?
The tests are the mirror images of each other.
Turning to the application of the tests, there are two potential
categories of cases where the objective and subjective version of
entrapment may diverge. The first is cases where the defendant is
entitled to only the subjective version of the defense. Such cases may
arise because the subjective version formally does not require the high
level of encouragement required by the objective test (encouragement
sufficient to affect an average citizen)–just inducement without
predisposition. Thus, there might be perpetrators found to be subjected
to only minimal encouragement (and hence not eligible for the
objective defense) yet still be subject to inducement and also
nonpredisposed (hence entitled to the subjective defense).
Accordingly, Professor Park has written, “Federal law is more
favorable to nondisposed defendants who succumbed to inducements
not sufficiently compelling to be deemed improper [under the objective
standard].”51
The potential class of defendants favored by the subjective
version, however, is likely very small. In order to be eligible for the
subjective version of the test, a person must not be predisposed to
commit the crime. If the nonpredisposed are defined as those not ready
and willing to commit the crime, there will be no defendants who
qualify for the subjective version unless they were exposed to an
inducement powerful enough to create a risk for those not otherwise
ready and willing. They would then qualify for the objective version as
well. This convergence of the tests follows from the subjective

51

Park, The Entrapment Controversy, supra note 14, at 199.
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version’s tendency, discussed earlier,52 to require a strong inducement
to avoid the inference–fatal to defendant’s claim–of predisposition.
For example, in United States v. Jacobson,53 the Supreme Court
found that, as a matter of law, the defendant had established the
entrapment defense in its subjective version. The defendant had been
induced to order child pornography as a result of an elaborate
government sting operation. The defendant had never purchased child
pornography previously. Only after a two and a half year campaign
involving mailings from five fictitious organizations and a bogus pen
pal did the defendant place his order.54 On these facts, the Supreme
Court concluded that the prosecution had failed to establish beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant was predisposed to violating the
Child Protection Act of 1984, which criminalizes the knowing receipt
through the mails of a “visual depiction [that] involves the use of a
minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.”55 Now imagine that
subsequently United States Congress adopts the objective version of
the entrapment defense and, shortly thereafter, the FBI employs similar
tactics against a person with a provable disposition to possess child
pornography. The defendant in this hypothetical case should be able to
establish the entrapment defense in its new objective form. In order to
demonstrate that the FBI’s conduct “creates a substantial risk that such
an offense would be committed by persons other than those ready to
commit it,” the defendant would need only cite Jacobson, where a
person found to be nonpredisposed to commit the offense actually did.
If the class of law-abiding citizens subsumes the class of
nonpredisposed persons, satisfaction of the subjection test should entail
the satisfaction of the objective test. The objective test’s placement of
the burden of proof on the defendant, compared to the subjective test’s
placement on the government of the critical predisposition issue, would
then account for cases satisfying the subjective test only.56
The second class of cases where the two tests potentially divide
comprises those cases where the defendant would succeed under the
objective test but fail under the subjective test. In such cases, the
52
53
54
55
56

See text accompanying note 35, supra.
503 U.S.540 (1992).
Id. at 542-47.
18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2)(A) (1984).
See text accompanying notes 16 and 48., supra.
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government agent’s conduct would be judged sufficient to induce a
nonpredisposed person, and so entitle the defendant to acquittal under
the objective version, but the defendant herself would be judged
predisposed, and hence not qualify for the subjective test.
This too may be a small class of cases. Professor Seidman
believes that it will be because the conduct alleged to be entrapment
may be described in a manner that minimizes the possibility that a
person not ready and willing might be induced by such conduct. For
example, the agent’s conduct may be described as “offering a huge
amount of money to a person strongly suspected of imminent criminal
activity.” If such a description is permitted, then despite the strength of
the inducement there is little chance that that very act would cause an
innocent person to commit a crime, because the inducement
definitionally was likely to be not directed at such a person.57 There is
some support for this interpretation of the objective test.58 Under such
an interpretation, the only cases where the objective version would
result in acquittal where the subjective would not would be cases where
the government inducement was directed at a person thought to be
nonpredisposed, but in fact it was a predisposed person. As discussed
below, these “lucky hit” cases–cases where the police unknowingly
entrap a criminally disposed person–may be few.
Professor Allen also thinks that practically there will be few
cases in which the objective version provides a defense, but the
subjective version would not. Allen argues that the inquiries under
both tests will in practice be similar. Where the fact-finder concludes
that the inducement was sufficient to cause an average person to act
(hence qualifying the defendant under the objective test), the fact-finder
57

Seidman states, “So long as the police direct their attention toward only those
likely to be predisposed, the risk of entrapment, objectively considered, is small, and
the inducement, therefore, presumably permissible.” Louis Michael Seidman, The
Supreme Court, Entrapment, and Our Criminal Justice Dilemma, 1982 SUP. CT.
REV.119-20.
58
Park agrees and writes, “The substantiality of the risk created cannot be
assessed without considering the surrounding circumstances, including facts about the
target that were known to the agent.” Park, The Entrapment Controversy, supra note
14, at 205, 205-08 (discussing Grossman v. Alaska, 457 P.2d 226, 229 (1969) (prior
conduct of selling relevant to whether police conduct was acceptable under objective
test) and People v. Turner, 210 N.W.2d 336, 338 (1973) (defendant’s statements
about heroine relevant to determining whether police conduct was acceptable under
objective test)).
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would likely have found the defendant nonpredisposed (hence entitling
any induced defendant to the subjective defense) because it lacks
evidence of criminality absent improper encouragement.59 In other
words, the excessive inducement directed at a predisposed person
deprives the prosecution of the critical inference of criminal act to
criminal predisposition. The excessive inducement is an alternative
plausible explanation of the criminal act. Likewise, where fact-finder
concludes that the defendant was predisposed (hence disqualifying the
defendant from the subjective defense), it would likely not have found
the inducement to be entrapment under the objective test because there
is no evidence of the effect of the test on an average person.60
While these points have weight, they likely go too far. Consider
Allen’s argument that cases satisfying the objective test will satisfy the
subjective test. While the most salient evidence of predisposition may
be responding to a low level inducement, evidence such as past or
subsequent criminal acts could support a finding of predisposition even
in cases of high inducement.61 For example, in Posner v. United
States,62 the government was permitted to introduce evidence that
defendant had attempted to buy drugs three and a half months after the
crime he was charged with committing.63 Such evidence can be quite
probative of predisposition. Thus it is conceivable that even a
defendant could be found predisposed (hence not entitled to the
subjective defense) where he had been induced by very powerful
persuasion (hence entitled to the objective defense).
There is a more mundane reason why there will be few cases that
establish objective entrapment, but not subjective entrapment.
Objective entrapment requires a high level of persuasiveness, such as
an appeal from a close friend; subjective entrapment occurs when a
nonpredisposed person is subject to an inducement. It will be rare that
high levels of persuasion (qualifying for objective entrapment) will be
directed against predisposed persons (ineligible for subjective
entrapment). Simply put, the use of such high levels would be overkill.
59

Ronald J. Allen, Clarifying Entrapment, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 407,
412-13 (1999).
60
Id.
61
Evidence of such acts is admissible in federal court to establish predisposition.
Fed. R. Evid. § 404(b).
62
865 F.2d 654, 657-58 (5th Cir. 1989).
63
See United States v. Posner, 865 F.2d 654, 657-58 (5th Cir. 1989).
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Because the defendant is predisposed, lower levels would suffice to
induce the criminal conduct necessary for conviction. Furthermore,
lower levels would be less likely to arouse the suspicions of the target
that he was being entrapped. For example, offering usually high
amounts of money for drugs may suggest an ulterior purpose. Finally,
lower levels would be more useful obtaining a conviction because they
would not mask critical evidence of predisposition. The police could
only be expected to use such unnecessarily strong inducements where
they mistakenly think their target is nonpredisposed, but to their
surprise, he is predisposed. These lucky hit cases will be rare if only
because persons predisposed to particular crime are relatively rare in
the general population.
In sum, the most common cases of entrapment, under either
version, will be when the police use (A) generally compelling
inducements against (B) nonpredisposed persons. Under the subjective
version, (B) is required, and assuming (B), (A) will usually be needed
for the inducement to result in the defendant’s acting criminally in the
first place. Under the objective version, (A) is required and usually
there will be (B), for why else bother with (A)? The Article’s analysis
of entrapment will therefore concentrate on cases with compelling
inducements turned against nonpredisposed persons. These cases
represent the lion’s share of entrapment cases under either version.
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III. Standard Theories of Entrapment
This Article began examining the problematic nature of the
entrapment defense. It pointed out that the success of the defense
turned on the status of the tempting party: If private party, conviction;
if government agent, acquittal. Yet the significance of the status of the
tempting party was not readily apparent. Why should cases of “private
entrapment” be treated differently from cases of “government
entrapment?”64 This Part of the Article canvasses the standard theories
of entrapment. These theories may be divided into retributivist,
utilitarian, civil rights, and autonomy theories. Each theory may be
understood, in part, as an attempt to give significance to the status of
the tempter. As discussed below, each theory is open to serious
challenge.
A. Entrapment and Retributivism
Retributivism is a theory about punishment.
retributivist concerns underlie the criminal law.65
64

Many believe
Briefly stated,

As used in this Article, “private entrapment” refers to conduct, circumstances,
and responses thereto involving a private party such that if that party were a
government agent, then under the law of the jurisdiction, the defendant would be able
to establish the entrapment defense. For example, if in an objective jurisdiction, a
nonpredisposed person is enticed into crime by a private individual offering a
inducement an ordinary citizen would be unlikely to resist, that person would be
privately entrapped. Private entrapment does not require that the entrapping
individual act with the purpose or hope that the entrapped individual will be
prosecuted because this is not a general requirement of entrapment under standard
formulations. If the mailings sent in Jacobson, 503 U.S. 540, see text accompanying
notes 7-8, supra, had been sent by state law enforcement agents merely in an attempt
to infiltrate an imagined child pornography network, Jacobson’s claim in the
subsequent federal prosecution should have been affected.
65
See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING REPORT at
36-41 (April 11, 2003) (endorsing a theory of form of retributivism which allows the
consideration of utilitarian factors to resolve retributive uncertainty); David Dolinko,
Three Mistakes of Retributivism, 39 UCLA L. Rev. 1623, 1623 (1992) (claiming that
retributivism "has enjoyed in recent years so vigorous a revival that it can fairly be
regarded today as the leading philosophical justification of the institution of criminal
punishment"); see also CAL PENAL CODE § 1170(a)(1) (West 2003) (“The Legislature
finds and declares that the purpose of imprisonment for crime is punishment.”).
Although currently enjoying popularity, retributivism is not without its critics. See
Russell Christopher, Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of "Just" Punishment, 96
NW. U. L. Rev. 843 (2002).
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retributivists believe that the imposing of criminal sanctions is justified
to the extent the sanctions are deserved.66 A retributivist theory of the
entrapment defense would justify the defense on the ground that those
who are entrapped do not deserve the harsh treatment that attends
conviction. Although there are many varieties of retributivism,67
retributivists generally analyze desert as a function of the gravity of the
wrongdoing at issue and the actor’s culpability for that wrong.68
Logically then, a retributivist theory of entrapment would maintain that
the defense is sound because the entrapped party has done no wrong or,
alternatively, is not to blame for the wrong done. These retributivist
approaches to entrapment are considered in turn.
1. Wrongdoing-Based Theories
Professor Carlson pursues the first approach. He advances the
view that the entrapment defense is valid from a retributivist
perspective because “the assumption of wrongfulness must fail in most
instances of government involvement.”69 Carlson equates wrongful
conduct with conduct that harms or threatens protected social interests.
In contrast to cases of private entrapment, Carlson observes, cases of
government entrapment are initiated, directed, monitored, and
orchestrated by the police. The government inevitably will step in to
make the arrest before the crime can be consummated. Thus, in
contrast to cases of private entrapment, there is virtually no chance that
any social interest will be harmed, and so, Carlson argues, from a
retributive perspective punishment is not deserved.70

66

FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 12 at 459-60; MICHAEL
MOORE, PLACING BLAME 87 (1997); Joel Feinberg, The Classic Debate, in
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 727, 726-29 (Joel Feinberg & Jules Coleman eds., 6th ed.
2000).
67
One basic distinction between retributivist theories is the distinction between
strong and weak brands of retributivism. Strong brands assert that desert is a
sufficient condition of punishment; weak brands assert it is merely a necessary
condition. See Christopher, Deterring Retributivism, supra note 65 at 865-66.
Because the Article’s discussion of retributivism equally applies to both versions, the
distinction shall be ignored.
68
See FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 12 at 461, MOORE,
PLACING BLAME, supra note 66, at 168.
69
Jonathon C. Carlson, The Act Requirement and the Foundations of the
Entrapment Defense, VA. L. REV. 1011, 1063 (1987).
70
Id.
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Carlson takes too narrow a view of retributivism. Although
Carlson considers one variation–contract retributivism–he fails too
consider another, subjective retributivism. According to subjective
retributivism, the wrongfulness of a person’s conduct is to be evaluated
from the epistemic position of the actor, that is, what the actor thought
he was doing.71 The dispute between subjective retributivists and
objective retributivists (those who believe that the wrongfulness of
conduct is to be judged based on what actually occurred) is far from
settled.72 Subjective retributivists have a strong claim to giving the
superior account of punishment for unsuccessful attempts, a universal
feature of modern criminal law. A person who attempts a crime
believes that his conduct creates a risk of the crime being completed.
The subjectivist explains he deserved to be punished based on that
belief. In contrast, objective retributivists must struggle to defend the
claim that in such cases the person’s conduct was objectively wrongful.
Often the riskiness of the person’s conduct is appealed to. From a
God’s eye point of view, where all facts are taken into account,
however, the risk that an unsuccessful attempt would succeed was zero.
The ascription of risk is relative to a vantage point with limited access
to the facts. Any other vantage point than God’s, where all the facts are
known, however, appears morally arbitrary.
Thus, objective
retributivism founders on the shoals of unsuccessful attempts.73
Subjectivism in turn can be criticized on the ground that it fails to
account for the common intuition that unsuccessful attempts should be
71

For the distinction between subjective (or culpability/intent _based theories)
and objective (or harm/wrongdoing _based theories) of retributivism, see Kevin Cole,
Killings During Crime: Toward a Discriminating Theory of Strict Liability, 28 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 73, 74_76 (1991); Michael S. Moore, The Independent Moral
Significance of Wrongdoing, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES, 237 (1994)
(distinguishing culpability and wrongdoing as independent bases of desert).
72
Compare Joel Feinberg, Equal Punishment for Failed Attempts: Some Bad but
Instructive Arguments Against It, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 117, 119 (1995) (arguing that
uncompleted attempts and completed crimes should be treated similarly); Sanford H.
Kadish, Foreword: The Criminal Law and the Luck of the Draw, 84 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 679, 684_86 (1994) (same); and MOORE, PLACING BLAME, supra note
66, ch. 5 (arguing results are relevant to desert) ; Leo Katz, Why the Successful
Assassin Is More Wicked Than the Unsuccessful One, 88 CAL. L. REV. 791 (2000)
(same).
73
See Larry Alexander, Crime and Culpability, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1,
17-21 (1994) (attacking the risk account of wrong-doing on these grounds).
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punished less than completed ones. Nevertheless, in light of the
weaknesses of its competitor, it is at least a viable form of
retributivism. From the perspective of subjective retributivism, those
governmentally entrapped deserve punishment just like other morally
culpable defendants who fail to commit the crimes they intended.
2. Culpability-Based Theories
Most retributive theories of entrapment focus on retributivism’s
culpability requirement. Such theories explain the defense on the
ground that those entrapped are not blameworthy. Such a theory may
be imputed to the United States Supreme Court, which has repeatedly
described those entrapped as “innocents.”74 In retributivists terms, their
innocence negates the blameworthiness required for punishment.
Likewise commentators supporting the subjective version of
entrapment defense have taken the position that defendants should not
be held liable because they are not blameworthy. In a much cited
article, Professor Park argues for the superiority of the subjective
version of the entrapment defense. In the course of the article, he
examines various possible justifications of the entrapment defense.
According to Park’s theory, the defense is justified because those who
are entrapped do not meet the retributivist requirements for
punishment. To Park, “it seems obvious that they are less blameworthy
. . . than the ordinary offender. Since they are less blameworthy, they
are less deserving of retributive punishment.”75
a. Culpability and the Problem of Private Entrapment–An
initial objection to this theory is that it seems inconsistent with the fact
that the criminal law provides no defense to persons in cases of private
entrapment.
It is commonly assumed that those who are
governmentally entrapped and those who are privately entrapped

74

See Jacobson v. United States, 112 S.Ct. 1535, 1547 (1992) (defense available
where if jury determines defendant just “innocent dupe”); Sherman v. United States,
356 U.S. 369, 372, (1958) (distinguishing between "unwary innocent" and "unwary
criminal"); Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 442 (1932) (finding where
disposition to crime is implanted in mind of “innocent person”).
75
Park, The Entrapment Controversy, supra note 14, at 240. Park also identifies
as a ground for the defense lack of dangerousness of those entrapped. Id. The
majority of his discussion, however, emphasizes lack of blameworthiness. Id. at 242
(arguing defense “properly concerned with culpability”); id. at 239 (asserting
“[i]njustice” of convicting nonpredisposed persons”); id at 265 (noting his theory
seeks to “excuse” entrapped).
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equally deserve punishment.76
Retributivists believe that an
individual’s culpability for risky or harmful conduct is based on his
subjective attitude toward the risk or harm. For example, in the
absence of an excuse or justification, a person who desires to cause the
harm is culpable for it. Call this the subjectivity of culpability
principle.77 Invariably, individuals who are entrapped by government
agents, like individuals who are entrapped by private parties, believe
that the person offering the inducement is a private party.
Governmentally and privately entrapped individuals share the same
subjective beliefs about the circumstances surrounding their illegal
conduct, and therefore, all things equal, are equally culpable. Yet
private entrapment is no defense. This fact implies that the privately
entrapped person is culpable for his conduct, and, based on the
subjectivity of culpability principle, that the governmentally entrapped
person is culpable too.
Park is keenly aware of the above argument and the challenge it
poses to his position.78 Rather than attempting to distinguishing cases
of government and private entrapment based on considerations of
culpability, Park adopts an ingenious strategy. Conceding that those
76

See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.13 cmt. at 406
(“Defendants who are aided, solicited, deceived or persuaded by police officials stand
in the same moral position as those who are aided, solicited, deceived or persuaded by
other persons . . . .”).
77
In limited circumstances, the criminal law will hold a person liable for harms
that the actor lacked a subjective attitude toward. A person may be liable for
negligence homicide if she causes a death where she failed to be aware her conduct
risked the life of another and a reasonable person would have been aware of that risk.
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.4. A person’s culpability for negligence, however, is
still strictly a function of subjective factors such as the defendant’s awareness of
evidence or circumstances that should have led her to appreciate the risk. See id. §
2.02(2)(d) (determination of negligence turns on the “circumstances known” to the
actor.).
78
In contrast to Park, Carlson believes the governmentally entrapped are morally
culpable. Running Park’s argument in reverse, Carlson believes this result is
necessary because otherwise the privately entrapped would be equally entitled to the
defense. Carlson, The Act Requirement and the Foundations of the Entrapment
Defense, supra note 69, at 1038. Seidman also makes this argument. See Seidman,
The Supreme Court, Entrapment, and Our Criminal Justice Dilemma, supra note 57,
at 132 (“We know that there is no generally held normative principle precluding
punishment of defendants succumbing to even very attractive inducements, because a
defendant offered such an inducement by a private person has no defense to the
resulting charge.”).
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privately entrapped are nonculpable just like those governmentally
entrapped, Park argues that “[R]ules intended to excuse nonculpable
persons from criminal liability must sometimes be limited in scope
because of the danger of contrived defenses.”79 Park analogizes to the
mistake of law defense. Although those who are misled by private
parties regarding to law seem no less culpable that those who are
mislead by public officials, the law–arguably justifiably–only extends
the defense to the latter group. The reason for this limitation is that
courts are afraid that otherwise there would be too many cases of
persons successfully presenting a false entrapment claim to the jury or
engaging in criminal conduct in the hope they will be able to do so.80
Likewise, Park argues, even though those privately entrapped are not
culpable, the law properly does not allow them to assert the entrapment
defense. To do so would create an unacceptably high risk of abuse in
the form of collusion and false claims.
Park’s argument is open to challenge. The criminal law is deeply
committed to punishing only those who deserve punishment, at least
where significant penalties are involved. Retributive limits on
punishment are not so easily overridden by speculative claims that
recognizing those limits in cases of private entrapment will lead to
abuse. The limitation of the mistake of law defense to those who have
been misled by public officials is not universally accepted.81
Furthermore, to the extent it is accepted, the limitation need not be
understood as an example of policy-based concerns of defense abuse
trumping valid retributive limits. As a general matter, those who rely
on the misrepresentation of public officials are in fact less culpable than
those who rely on the misrepresentations of private parties. It is more
reasonable to rely on the representations of those legally charged with
stating the law because they are usually more knowledgeable. Those
who rely on the representation of private parties, know, or should
know, they are doing so at their own risk. There is at least a significant
subjective difference between those who rely on private and
79

Park, The Entrapment Controversy, supra note 5, at 241.
See MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.04, ctm. at 280.
81
See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:2-4(c)(3) (West 1995) (extending defense to any
person who "diligently pursues all means available to ascertain the meaning and
application of the offense to his conduct and honestly and in good faith concludes his
conduct is not an offense in circumstances in which a law_abiding and prudent person
would also so conclude").
80
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government statements of the law. This difference, rather than public
policy concerns, can account for limitation of the mistake of law
defense. Accordingly, it is far from clear that the government-agent
limitation of the entrapment defense can satisfactorily be explained
based on policy-based concerns of abuse.82
The difficulty with Park’s position, however, runs deeper. Park
never attempts to defend what he takes to be the “obvious”83 fact that
those who are entrapped (governmentally or privately) are nonculpable.
Consider a person who is either not predisposed to crime and yet yields
to a necessarily powerful temptation (under the subjective version) or
who is subjected to a temptation that even a reasonable person might
well yield to (under the objective version). Is there any reason to
believe that this person, who has deliberately chosen wrongly, 84 should
not be considered nonculpable? Although intuitions differ sharply on
the question,85 commentators have given it insufficient attention.86 At
82

Park, The Entrapment Controversy, supra note 14, at 241. Park also argues
that limiting the defense to those governmentally entrapped is justified because of
other policy-related concerns that distinguish cases of government and private
entrapment, such as possible wasteful use of police resources and chilling effect on
political activity. Id. at 242-43. These other public-policy rationales are addressed
infra, §§ III.B-C.
83
Park, The Entrapment Controversy, supra note 14, at 240.
84
There is no requirement under either verison of the entrapment defense that the
defendant’s ability to reason was somehow overcome by the offer, so that the
defendant acted “in the heat of passion,” or, more relevantly, the heat of greed.
85
Fletcher, for example, apparently disagrees with Park, asserting in his
discussion of entrapment that “succumbing to temptation is a paradigm case of
blameworthy conduct.” FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 12, at
542. Professor Park takes the opposite position that there is “no accepted notion of
culpability applicable to a person” who is entrapped. Allen, Clarifying Entrapment,
supra note 59, at 416. Little argument, however, is provide to support these claims.
86
Although Carlson considers the issue, his analysis is not satisfactory. Carlson,
contra Park, believes that the entrapped are morally culpable. He begins with the
premise that in subjective entrapment jurisdictions, the law correctly ascribes
culpability to a predisposed person who is induced to crime. According to Carlson, if
a predisposed person is blameworthy, so should be the nonpredisposed person who
responds to the same inducement. After all, Carlson reasons, in contrast to the
predisposed who are naturally susceptible to inducements (such as the pedophile), the
nonpredisposed have no excuse for yielding to a given temptation. Carlson, The Act
Requirement and the Foundations of the Entrapment Defense, supra note 69, at 1038.
Carlson rejects any attempt to elevate the nonpredisposed over the predisposed
due to the latter’s arguable moral inferiority for being predisposed to crime. Carlson
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best, the question is controversial, especially when considered in the
context of the most difficult case: the enticement of a person of
ordinary resistance.
Below the Article considers two potentially attractive arguments
for the position that those who are entrapped are not culpable: the first
based on an analogy to duress, the second based on considerations of
the practical limits of character. Although the arguments are ultimately
rejected, their prima facie appeal may explain why some courts and
commentators have taken the position that those qualifying for the
entrapment defense should not be blamed for engaging in criminal acts.
b. Culpability and Duress–The first argument for the
nonculpability of the entrapped is based on an analogy between
entrapment and duress. It proceeds as follows:
Argument from Duress
Persons who engage in prohibited conduct
as a result of significant threats are entitled to
the defense of duress. Depending on the
jurisdiction, significant threats are threats of
serious bodily injury or threats a person of
reasonable firmness would not be able to resist.
The duress defense is best construed an excuse
writes that “[b]lame in the criminal law is not normally assessed through an
examination of the actor’s underlying character or criminal propensities.” Id. at 1041.
Accordingly, Carlson believes that just as it would be inconsistent with the criminal
law’s narrow focus to convict based on propensity alone, e.g., sexual attraction to
children, so it would be inconsistent to excuse the entrapped on the ground of their
lack of propensity. Carlson’s characterization of the criminal law’s approach to
culpability, however, is only partially correct. The determination of prima facie
culpability is an extremely narrow inquiry. Offense definitions usually only require a
showing of intent or recklessness, two discrete subjective mental states that must exist
concurrently with the conduct. Excuses, however, traditionally allow for a much
broader inquiry. They allow the defendant an opportunity to show that, for one
reason or another, his cases is an exception to the broad rules of thumb for culpability
established by the offense definitions. Although the criminal law is concerned in the
first instance with whether the definition of the offense has been satisfied, it is, as
Carlson ultimately acknowledges, id. at 1042 n. 115., concerned at bottom with
quality of character and virtue. The general lack of criminal propensities of the
entrapped should not be bracketed off when assessing their culpability. It should, at
least potentially, be available to find them not blameworthy.
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defense, that is, it is grounded on the principle
that the actor is not culpable for his act because
he did not have a fair opportunity to not engage
in it. There was no fair opportunity because of
the significant sanction that was being faced
Likewise, persons who engage in prohibited
conduct as a result of a significant offer
(whether made by a government agent or private
party) should be found nonculpable and be
entitled to a defense. Here a “significant offer”
might mean an offer of equivalent value to not
being seriously harmed or of a magnitude that a
person of reasonable firmness would not be able
to resist. Because of the attractiveness of the
offer, there was no fair opportunity to resist.
Acquittal
based
on
the
defendant’s
nonculpability is therefore warranted.87
The Argument from Duress rests on the initial premise that the
persons subject to duress are not liable because they lacked a fair
opportunity to act lawfully. This premise is somewhat controversial.88
87

The preceding argument for nonculpability provides a straightforward account
of why a nonpredisposed person does not deserve to be punished: in light of the
magnitude of the offer, he is not blameworthy. The argument, however, appears less
successful in explaining why a predisposed person deserves to be acquitted, as he
would be under the objective version of the defense. Nevertheless, it may be
extended by adding the following premise: A person is only culpable for an act if he
engaged in it as a result of a character flaw, where “as a result” implies the flaw was a
but-for cause of the act. This premise is plausible, at least on character theories of
culpability which ground desert in the manifestation of bad character. See, e.g,
FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW supra note 12, at 800 (recommending
character theory), George Vuoso, Background, Responsibility, and Excuse, 96 YALE
L.J. 1661 (1987) (same); Michael D. Bayles, Character, Purpose and Criminal
Responsibility, 1 LAW & PHIL. 5 (1982) (same). Where a predisposed actor had
responded to enticements strong enough to overcome the resistance of a law-abiding
citizen, the actor’s bad character cannot be inferred from his conduct–a
nonpredisposed person would have acted similarly. Thus, if the Duress Argument is
sound for nonpredisposed actors, it may also account on retributivist grounds for the
acquittal of predisposed actors under the objective version of entrapment. In any
case, as argued in earlier, see text accompanying notes 57-63, supra, most defendants
who qualify for the objective version will in fact be nonpredisposed.
88
Professor LaFave takes the view that the duress is not an excuse defense based
on lack of fair opportunity to comply with the law, but a justification defense based
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Accepting it for the sake of argument, we may focus on the more
interesting question whether the argument correctly equates acting
based on threats and offers. Threats and offers clearly have much in
common. Both threats and offers provide reasons that potentially bear
powerfully on a person’s decisions by making a change in the actor’s
utility dependent on her choice regarding a course of action.
Nevertheless, threats and offers are clearly distinguishable. In his
discussion of entrapment, Professor Siedman explains the distinction is
that offers expand the range of choices, while threats contract the range
of choices.89 Construed literally, this distinction appears dubious.
While threats make one option (not engaging in the requested conduct)
less attractive, it is still an option. Furthermore, even if this distinction
is accepted as a matter of definition, it is unclear why it should make a
moral difference. Seidman suggests the morally critical fact is that one
has a right not to be threatened, but not a right to be free of an offer.90
As a matter of rights, this may be so. But why should this moral
distinction between the permissibility of threats and offers carry over to
the response to them? In his analysis of the offer/threat distinction,

on the necessity of the defendant’s conduct to avoid the comparatively great
threatened harm. See LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 5, at 473-74. His view is
supported by the common law formulation of the defense, which requires a serious
threat and does not extend to murder. See id. at Professor Dressler takes the opposite
view, asserting that duress is an excuse for engaging in even unjustified criminal acts.
Joshua Dressler, Exegesis of the Law of Duress: Justifying the Excuse and Searching
for Its Proper Limits, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1359-60 (1989). His view is supported by
the Model Penal Code formulation of the defense which would allow a jury to grant
the defense even in cases of justified conduct, for example the defendant’s killing of
two to save himself. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 (permitting defense for where
“a person of reasonable firmness in [the defendant’s] situation would have been
unable to resist [the threat].”). To the extent that duress is really a justification, it
cannot provide a useful analogy to understand entrapment. There may be cases where
yielding to a threat is justified in the sense of yielding being the lesser evil. If a
person faces death if he does not aid a plan to embezzle $10,000, his aiding would be
justified. It is however, difficult to imagine cases whether an enticed person could
argue justification. The advantage of the offer could hardly offset the harm of the
offense. A person would not be offered $20,00 to aid a plan to embezzle

$10,000.
89

See Seidman, The Supreme Court, Entrapment, and Our Criminal Justice
Dilemma, supra note 57, at 133.
90
See id. at 134.
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Seidman considers confrontations between homeowners and burglars.91
Seidman points out that homeowners may legally avoid harm by
resisting burglars, but burglars may not legally realize a benefit by
taking from homeowners. Homeowners are facing the threat of losing
goods; burglars are facing the enticement of gaining goods. Although
they both may face the same attraction to the same material goods of
the homeowner, only the burglar will be liable for acts to secure those
goods.
Seidman explains this asymmetry on the ground that
homeowners face a threat of loss while burglars experience merely the
opportunity for gain.92 This asymmetry, however, does not support or
explain a general distinction between those who respond to threats and
those who respond to offers. Homeowners may use force to defend
their property because such action is justified; burglars may not use
force against the homeowner to acquire property because such action is
not justified. The law’s right-based distinction between homeowners
and burglars (who confront equally compelling motivations) therefore
does not explain or illuminate the distinction being those wrongdoers
who act because of a threat and those who act because of an offer.
Seidman’s analysis of entrapment as an expansion of options seems to
be conceptually accurate, but lacks the normative punch necessary to
refute the Argument from Duress’s equating of duress and entrapment.
An alternative basis for morally distinguishing the effect of
threats and offers is made by the philosopher Robert Nozick. Nozick
suggests that the critical difference between threats and offers is that
one would always choose to be made an offer–if can never hurt to have
the option–but not choose to be subjected to threat. Approving, at least
implicitly, the offer that led to the action, one should be held
responsible for the action no matter how compelling the offer.93 Being
the recipient of an offer, no matter how overpoweringly tempting, one
can no more defeat accountability, Nozick might argue, than acting
based on a hypnotic suggestion that the person requested to have
implanted in him. In contrast, the threat was unwelcome. If
encountering it could have been avoided, it would have been. Because
one lacked a fair opportunity to avoid the threat, one may have lacked a
91

See id at 133.
Id.
93
Robert Nozick, Coercion, in PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE AND METHOD: ESSAYS IN
HONOR OF ERNEST NAGEL 440 (Sidney Morgenbesser et al. eds., 1969).
92
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fair opportunity to avoid complying with the threat. Thus the target of
a threat, unlike the target of an offer, has a valid excuse for his
wrongdoing.
The difficulty with Nozick’s argument is that it just pushes the
problem back a level. Nozick’s analysis focuses not only on the choice
between the act and the consequence of not acting, but the hypothetical
choice between whether to have the choice or not. It is true that if
asked whether we would want an offer involving a potential benefit, we
would choose to have the offer, while we would not choose to be
exposed to a threat. But this is only because we are informed that the
offer will be attractive and we anticipate that we might accept it. If we
cannot be blamed for not refusing an extremely attractive offer itself,
we cannot be blamed for hypothetically choosing to be made such an
offer. It is the same attraction to the ultimate benefit that motivates
both choices. If we cannot be faulted for yielding to powerful threats
because these, in appealing to our self-interest, deny us a fair
opportunity to resist, then we cannot be faulted for yielding to equally
compelling offers on the ground that these offers were “welcomed.”
We had no more a fair opportunity to find the offers unwelcome in the
first place than to resist them once made.
Is there then no satisfying response to the Argument from
Duress’s equating of yielding to threats and equally compelling offers?
I suggest the normative basis for the distinction begins with Nozick’s
and Seidman’s observations that, as a general matter, we are adverse to
receiving threats and have the right not to be threatened. Where a
person is unlawfully threatened, we properly feel sorry for the targeted
person because he is in a position he should not have to be in. This
feeling of compassion then is manifested by generously granting the
threat’s target an exemption from the usual punishment that follows
from his unjustified yielding to the threat. Leniency toward the coerced
is, if not strictly deserved, at least an appropriate act of charity. In
contrast, the person who yields to an offer, something generally
advantageous, has no claim to sympathy.94 The reason the yielding to
threats, but not offers, is excusable may also be tied to the idea that
94

While enticements to crime are legally prohibited, they are not considered a
wrong against the person solicited, but a wrong against the would-be victim of the
solicited crimes. The target of a solicitation, whether accepted or not, cannot bring a
tort claim against the person making the offer alleging that he was harmed by the
offer.
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society has failed the one threatened. Society seeks to protect persons
from unlawful threats. Having itself failed to protect the target of the
threat from the threat, society should not, as a matter of equity, punish
the person for yielding to the threat. This equitable theory of the duress
defense might be a strange form of pay-back, but it has some intuitive
resonance.95 If it is correct, it constitutes a more persuasive refutation
of the Argument from Duress than those previously offered.
c. Culpability and Character Development–Here is a second
possible argument why those who are entrapped, whether privately or
governmentally, are not morally blameworthy and so should not be
punished.
Argument from Limited Resources
As a general matter, the criminal law
excuses individuals who have made a
reasonable effort to comply with the law. For
example, persons who engage in prohibited
conduct because they have made a reasonable
mistake of fact are not culpable. An actor will
not be criminally liable for shooting a person if
the actor reasonably believed that he was either
shooting a scarecrow or reasonably believed the
victim was unlawfully attacking him with lethal
force. The law does not demand omniscience.
Likewise, the law does not demand “old heads
on young shoulders”96 and will take the youth of
a defendant into account when judging the
reasonableness of his conduct. Finally, the law
does not demand heroism. Under the duress
defense, a person will not be held liable for
committing a crime because of undue pressure.
The reason for granting these excuses turns
on the fact that we bear some responsibility for
developing our characters and abilities.
Choosing the type of person we will be is not as
easy as choosing an action of a specific
95

Sanford H. Kadish, Respect for Life and Regard for Rights in the Criminal
Law, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 871, 884-86 (1976).
96
Director of Public Prosecutions v. Camplin, House of Lords, 2 All Eng.Rep.
68, 2 W.L.R. 679 (1978).

UNRAVELING UNLAWFUL ENTRAPMENT

occasion. Nevertheless, as we go through life,
we
make
innumerable
micro-decisions
concerning how we will develop our characters
and abilities.
Excuses reflect the law’s
recognition that even if we make all the
appropriate decisions regarding development,
we will still be limited, fallible and imperfect.
This is so if only because there must be some
trade-offs among virtues. There are many
virtues worth developing: prudence, selfdiscipline, courage, tolerance, sensitivity,
judgment, loyalty, etc. Not all can be developed
to the maximum extent. The opportunity cost of
reading an inspiring biography of Ghandi may
be foregoing a training session for a marathon
run, a morning at church, or time with one’s
children. The greater development of some
virtues some will result in lesser development of
others. Once we have made the correct decision
concerning the degree to develop various
virtues, we should not be blamed for the
resultant limitation of other virtues
In light of this theory of excuses, those who
yield to offers of the type necessary to establish
the entrapment defense–those strong enough
either to induce the nonpredisposed (under the
subjective version) or to overcome the
resistance of a law-abiding citizen (under the
objective version)–should be considered
blameless. Persons cannot be expected to
develop more than a reasonable degree of
resistance to temptation.
In particular,
expending too much effort at developing this
virtue might result in the development of a
character that was stodgy, stoic, distant, or
lacking in appreciation of the world’s offerings.
One cannot be blamed for yielding to temptation
where one has done all that reasonably should
be done to steel one’s character. While the

32
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decision to accept the enticement may be wrong,
the lifestyle decisions that produced it may be
right. Appropriate action at this more abstract
level of decision-making excuses the actor’s
conduct.
This argument, though attractive in theory, likely goes too far.
Doubtless we must take responsibility for developing our characters,97
or at least failing to change our character flaws,98 and, through no fault
of our own, some virtues will be less well developed than they might
have been had more effort been made. Nevertheless, if relative to a
given situation they are deficient, we cannot disown the deficiency on
the ground we did our best to develop our characters given what we had
to work with. We cannot blame our bad choices on our characters
because, for better or worse, we are our characters.99 There is no
characterless metaphysical ego that we can identify ourselves with in
order to distance ourselves from our character. To assert so would be
equivalent to claiming that “you” could have been born to different
parents at a completely different time and place. Character, as much as
parents and circumstances of birth, is constitutive of self-identity. This
conceptual fact has moral implications. Just as you cannot legitimately
blame your mother for not bearing “you” ten years later with a different
father regardless of the objective merit of her decision, so you cannot
blame your character for your decisions regardless of its objective merit
of your character. From the fact that we, as mortals, possess limited
virtue only follows that we, as mortals, must sometimes be
blameworthy for our wrongful acts manifesting this limit.
97

See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, Bk.III, ch. 5., translated in THE BASIC
WORKS OF ARISTOTLE (Richard McKeon ed., 1941) (discussing a person’s power to
develop virtues or vices and so at least partial responsibility for character); see also
TERENCE IRWIN, ARISTOTLE'S FIRST PRINCIPLES § 182, at 344 (1988) (interpreting
this chapter of Aristotle); Kyron Huigens, Nietzsche and Aretaic Legal Theory, 24
CARZ. L. REV. 563, 575 (2003). Peter Arenella, Convicting the Morally Blameless:
Reassessing the Relationship Between Legal and Moral Accountability, 39 U.C.L.A.
L. REV. 1511 (1992).
98
See ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 396 (1981) (arguing that
even if a person may sometimes not be blamed for acquiring a character defect, he
may be blamed for failing to cure it).
99
See Michael S. Moore, Choice, Character, and Excuse, 7 SOC. PHIL & POL.
29, 50 (1990) (making point in context of claim that persons not responsible for
character because of causal determinism).
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This view of character underlies much of the criminal law. For
example, there is no rotten social background defense.100 Lack of
social resources does not excuse bad character. The best of us may
become corrupted if unlucky enough. Indeed, the corruption of the
innocent by the environment must happen all the time, unless we
believe that some people are intrinsically or congenitally evil. This is
one aspect of moral luck. We take responsibility for who we are, even
if it is not our fault for who we are.101
An analogy from the law of homicide also may be illuminating.
The criminal law imposes liability for negligently causing the death of
another person. The existence of criminal negligence is determined by
considering whether a reasonable person in the defendant’s situation
would have been aware of the risk associated with her conduct and
acted otherwise.102 If so, it will not do to argue that instances of
negligence are inevitable even in reasonable persons. For example, if
Jake becomes distracted while driving at the end of a cross-country
drive and hits and kills a pedestrian whom he would have seen and
avoided but for his criminal negligence, Jake cannot avoid liability by
showing that he drove exceptionally well the rest of the trip, pointing
out that even good drivers like him occasionally suffer lapses of
attention. Even reasonable people act unreasonably at times, and when
they (we) do, they (we) must pay the price. The yielding to temptation
of a nonpredisposed person to an excessive temptation is analogous to
the rare, but inevitable, negligent act of even a person who is
reasonably attentive and careful. The only difference is the type of
mens rea–intent rather than mere negligence. Being nonpredisposed,
i.e., reasonably resistant to temptation, may bar liability, but it does not
do so because being nonpredisposed implies being nonculpable in a
particular instance. As a matter of morals, a person should not accept
100

See United States v. Alexander, 471 F.2d 923, 959 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (upholding
instruction that jury should not be concerned with whether the defendant had "a rotten
social background"). See generally, Richard Delgado, “Rotten Social Background”:
Should the Criminal Law Recognize a Defense of Severe Environmental
Deprivation?, 3 LAW AND INEQUALITY 9 (1985).
101
Both Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel refer to the fact that some aspects of
our character are beyond our control as "constitutive luck." See Bernard Williams,
Moral Luck, in MORAL LUCK: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 20 (1981); Thomas Nagel,
Moral Luck, in MORTAL QUESTIONS 28 (1979).
102
See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.02(2)(d), 210.4; LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW, supra
note 5, § 15.4.
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any enticement to wrongdoing, even if a person with a reasonably
resistant character would accept. Accordingly, the Lack of Resources
Argument for excusing some prima facie culpable choices will not fly.
To summarize the argument thus far: Retributivism offers a
possible, but ultimately unpersuasive, justification for the exoneration
of those governmentally entrapped. Though those entrapped rarely
cause social harm, they have committed wrongdoing, at least in the
sense they have acted with the intent to engage in acts believed harmful
to the community. Furthermore, they have acted culpably. Unlike
those who have responded to threats and may invoke the duress
defense, they have responded to circumstances that society was not
generally obliged to shield them from and are owed no dispensation.
Furthermore, though they might not be blamed for failing to develop
character qualities to resist offers of the type needed to qualify for the
defense, they may be blamed for failing to resist the offer itself.
Accordingly, if the entrapment defense is to be justified, it must be so
on nonretributivist grounds.
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B. Entrapment and Utilitarianism
This section considers whether the entrapment defense is justified
from a utilitarian perspective. According to utilitarianism, the correct
act is the one that maximizes the good.103 The good may be measured
in terms of happiness, pleasure, utility, wealth, or welfare, depending
on the brand of utilitarianism.104 Maximizing social welfare requires
considering the costs and benefits of a course of action. With respect to
punishment, reducing crime is the principal benefit offered.
Punishment reduces crimes by incapacitating, rehabilitating, and
deterring those who would commit crimes, as well as communicating
and inculcating norms of appropriate conduct.105 The costs associated
with punishment include the costs of apprehending, adjudicating and
incarcerating those to be punished, as well as any lost productivity of
those punished and the adverse effects on family and friends. From a
utilitarian perspective, then, punishing the entrapped is justified only if
these benefits, as a general matter, outweigh these costs.
Approaching entrapment from a utilitarian perspective is not
novel.
Professor Allen, for example, takes a law and economics
perspective on the entrapment defense.106 Allen focuses on the
subjective version of the defense. For Allen, the central issue to be
examined in evaluating the defense is the meaning of “predisposition.”
Allen believes that virtually everybody has some propensity to crime
because everybody has a price. If a person’s price is met, his
propensity will manifest itself in action.107 The only way to give the
term “predisposition” content so that it indicates a meaningful
distinction among those with some propensity to crime, Allen believes,
is to define “predisposition” in terms of a propensity to respond to a
particular price. But what should that price be? Allen thinks that
currently prevailing price in the market of criminal behavior is the
103

JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION 12_13 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., Athlone Press 1970) (1789).
104
See Michael S. Moore, Justifying the Natural Law Theory of Constitutional
Interpretation, 69 FORD. L. REV. 2087, 2108 (2001).
105
See FREDRICK M. LAWRENCE, PUNISHING HATE: BIAS CRIMES UNDER
AMERICAN LAW 46 (1999).
106
See Allen, Clarifying Entrapment, supra note 59. Law-and-economics is an
outgrowth of utilitarianism applied to legal studies. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (5th ed. 1998).
107
See Allen, Clarifying Entrapment, supra note 59, at 413.
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appropriate price to use when defining “predisposition” for the purpose
of the entrapment doctrine.108 The market price of criminal behavior is
how much a person in the real world would have to be paid to commit a
crime. Allen here adopts the economists expansive view of payments,
which can include emotional as well as financial or psychological gain.
The price to commit the crime of distribution of narcotics may be the
street price of the narcotics, the receipt or peer approval, sexual
satisfaction, discharge of a moral debt, or career advancement.109
From Allen’s perspective, the exoneration of those falling within
the entrapment defense is easily explained. If a nonpredisposed person
commits a crime, it means that he has accepted an offer that is above
the market level. Accepting such an offer, however, tells nothing about
the likelihood that a person would respond to lesser inducements, such
as those at or below the market level, which the person might
realistically encounter.110 Therefore there is no reason to believe that
those who are entrapped are in need of rehabilitation, incapacitation, or
deterrence.
1. Utilitarianism and the Problem of the Private Entrapment
Allen’s argument for the acquittal of the entrapped applies with
equal force to cases of government and private entrapment. A
defendant’s accepting of an above-market criminal solicitation does not
indicate a real-world propensity to crime whether the offer was made to
a government agent or private citizen.111 Allen, however, is not
embarrassed by this implication of his theory. According to Allen,
cases of private entrapment will be highly unlikely. To overpay the
market price is, in Allen’s view, tantamount to a charitable donation.112
In any event, to the extent that Allens’ theory is inconsistent with
positive law in recommending the acquittal of a privately entrapped
person, the theory may be construed as a normative one recommending
108

See id. at 415 (“The most fruitful criterion of government inducements we
have been able to identify to sort out those who have a plausible claim for exoneration
is whether the inducements exceeds real world market rates . . . .”).
109
See id. at 415 (referring to both “financial and emotional” markets)..
110
See id. Carlson similarly opines that “if the defendant was encouraged by the
government its utility as a predictor of danger may reasonably be called into
question.” Carlson, The Act Requirement and the Foundations of the Entrapment
Defense, supra note 69, at 1071.
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Allen, Clarifying Entrapment, supra note 59, at 420.
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Id. at 421.
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the entrapment defense be expanded to shield even privately entrapped
nonpredisposed individuals.
Allen’s account of the entrapment defense is questionable. As
discussed below, government entrapment would result in palpable
benefits; the cost would not be prohibitive.
2. The Benefits of Entrapment and Conviction
Contrary to Allen’s claims, there are benefits associated with
convicting the entrapped. The weak point in Allen’s analysis of
entrapment is his discussion of deterrence. Theorists distinguish
between general specific deterrence–the deterrence of the punished
person who learns the hard way that crime does not pay–and general
deterrence–the deterrence of the members of the general population
who learn the lesson through observation of examples. Admittedly,
little utility is achieved through deterring a nonpredisposed person who
has been induced to crime on one occasion. Although engaging in
criminal conduct once may undermine a person’s habitual respect for
law, being apprehended and charged, or at least caught in the act,
should be an adverse enough experience to reinforce the norm against
law breaking.
Allen, however, undervalues the general deterrence effects of
punishing those who are entrapped, either governmentally or privately.
First, the nonpredisposed become aware that even their normal level of
resistance to temptation may not be enough to avoid criminal liability.
Although it will be rare that a nonpredisposed person has occasion to
engage in crime, it does happen. Consider the following case:
Russ is a 46-year-old state trooper who lives
with his wife and daughter. While on duty, he is
approached by Lucy, an undercover officer.
Lucy is young, attractive, dressed in cut-off
jeans and t-shirt. Eventually, the two start
talking about “partying,” and each admit to
getting high. Russ tells her he in general terms
he has access to drugs. Over a period of a year,
they meet a handful of times, Lucy requesting
Russ obtain drugs for her, and Russ putting her
off or telling her where she can get them herself.
They kiss on occasion, and present themselves
in public as a couple. Russ develops a romantic
interest in Lucy. Russ suggests to Lucy that she
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move to his town and that he will pay half of the
rent. Lucy continually chides Russ for not
coming through with marijuana. as he says he
will. On one occasion, in response to her
chiding, he her buys $10 worth of marijuana
which they smoke together. On a later occasion
he offers to obtain more, but does not. Russ is
charged with unlawful delivery of marijuana
and criminal conspiracy.113
Russ would probably be considered nonpredisposed and be able to
establish entrapment if Lucy worked for the police.114 Convicting
Russ, regardless whether Lucy worked for the police, would plausibly
deter other older, professional men who might identify with him.
Seeing Russ taken to jail, they might think, “There but for the Grace of
God go I” and redouble their conviction not to become involved in
drugs (or younger women for that matter).
Second, cases of governmental entrapment, the core controversial
cases, may have a significant deterrence effect on the predisposed.
Entrapping and convicting a nonpredisposed individual would send an
enormously powerful message that government is aggressively
enforcing a given prohibition. Consider, for example, the facts of
Jacobson v. United States.115 The defendant had purchased child
pornography only after a lengthy and elaborate undercover government
campaign of enticement.116 If he had been convicted, those disposed to
purchase child pornography, as well as those disposed to produce it,
would have reasonably inferred that no one is safe from being targeted
by a government sting operation. The government’s commitment to
expending resources to fight child pornography would be dramatically
and memorably demonstrated. Or, as Seidman has observed, “the few
well-publicized cases of Arab sheiks who turned out to be FBI agents
are likely to make members of Congress think twice before accepting a
113

Cf. Commonwealth v. Thompson, 484 A.2d 159 (Sup. Ct. Pa. 1984)
(recounting similar facts).
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In fact, the issue of predisposition was not reached by the Court because it
applied the objective test. See id. If the question whether Russ was predisposed had
been considered, he likely would not have found predisposed because of his long
record of failing to deliver despite his promises.
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112 S. Ct. 1535 (1992).
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See text accompany note 8, supra.
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bribe.”117 Indeed, the apparent irrationality of prosecuting even a
person who presents little potential threat may attest to the
government’s retributivist commitment to punishing crime wherever
and whenever it occurs.118
The rationality of the government’s
engaging in an act which, considered discreetly, appears irrational, has
been recognized in other contexts.119
3. The Costs of Convicting the Entrapped
As discussed earlier, utilitarians must consider the costs, as well
as the benefits, of any proposed course of conduct. Conviction of the
governmentally entrapped obviously imposes costs on society, such as
court costs and the cost of incarceration. Many of these costs, however,
are no different from the ones associated with the conviction of the
privately entrapped. These costs are not thought to be prohibitively
high, as demonstrated by the fact that the privately entrapped may not
invoke the entrapment defense. Are there costs unique to cases of
government entrapment which might justify the defense? This section
addresses arguments that there is a significant difference between those
privately and those governmentally entrapped that justifies recognizing
the entrapment defense for the latter.
The Model Penal Code justifies the entrapment defense based on
the costs that government entrapment imposed on society. According
to the Commentaries, probably the most important consideration
supporting the defense is “the injury to the reputation of the law
enforcement institutions that follows the employment of methods
shocking to the moral standards of the community.”120 Since the
methods of the police, not the defendant’s subjective mental state, are
117

See Seidman, The Supreme Court, Entrapment, and Our Criminal Justice
Dilemma, supra note 57, at 142.
118
See Paul Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L.
REV. 453, 454 (1997) (recognizing the utilitarian value of retributivist policy in
criminal law).
119
See Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict 18_19 (1960) (applying
considerations of strategic irrationality to nuclear deterrence); see also Larry
Alexander, The Deceptive Nature of Rules, 142 U. Penn. L. Rev. 1191, n.9 1195
(1994) (“If one wants to be a rational deterrer of others' threatening acts, one may
have to become irrational.”).
120
MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, supra note 6, § 2.13 cmt. at 406.
See also, Sherman v. United Sates, 365 U.S. 435, 380 (1958) (“transcending value at
stake” is “public confidence in the fair and honorable administration of justice”)
(Frankfurter, J. concurring).
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the focus of the inquiry, the Commentaries support the objective
version of the defense.121 Those entrapped should be acquitted, the
Commentaries imply, not because they have a moral right to be, but
because acquitting them will remove the incentive of police to engage
in conduct that harms their own reputation. If people do not respect the
police, criminality will be fostered in the long run, contrary to the aims
of traditional utilitarianism. The entrapment defense is therefore
similar to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. Both are doctrines
serving as prophylactic devices to inhibit future police conduct.122
The Model Penal Code’s theory rests on a number of problematic
assumptions. First is the assumption that entrapment harms the
reputation of the police. The Commentaries state, “In spite of the
defendant’s moral guilt in committing the crime, he will enlist much
popular sympathy if he has acted because of shocking police
conduct.”123 This is empirically doubtful. As the drafters admit
elsewhere, the public has never shown great sympathy for those who
are morally guilty.124 This general truth has been accepted in the
context of the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment right
against unreasonable searches and seizures is primarily enforced
through the exclusionary rule,125 rather than civil damage actions. The
public, it is thought, would be strongly averse to recognizing the claims
of a criminal and would have much greater sympathies for the police.126
121

Model Penal Code § 2.13 (defense available when a government agent induces
a person to engage in criminal conduct through “inducements that create a substantial
risk that such an offense will be committed by persons other than those ready to
commit it.”).
122
See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (characterizing
exclusionary rule as judicially created remedy to designed to safeguard rights through
deterrence, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved).
123
MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, supra note 6, § 2.13 cmt. at 407.
124
In its discussion of the entrapment defense, the Commentaries explain why the
court, rather jury, should determine whether the requirements of defense are met:
“[T]he rights of persons accused are little understood or respected by the community
at large. Juries are apt to give great latitude to the police, at least in relation to an
otherwise guilty defendant.” Id. at 418.
125
See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1918)
(establishing the inadmissibility of evidence seized in violation of the Fourth
Amendment).
126
See Office of Legal Policy, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Truth in Criminal Justice
Series, Report No. 2, Report to the Attorney General on the Search and Seizure
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In the context of the Fourth Amendment, the police misconduct is
starker because a legally recognized interest–the interest in privacy–is
violated. In contrast, there is no right, constitutional or statutory,
against being entrapped. It is difficult to think that a substantial
segment of the public would lose respect for the police for
apprehending a person who voluntarily purchased child pornography or
dealt in drugs. This is especially true in those cases under the objective
version where the defendant was predisposed to the crimes. In cases of
nonpredisposed defendants, the most common reaction, as suggested
earlier, would be an increased wariness and resolve to avoid such
situations where one might be entrapped.
In any event, when considering the effects of entrapment on crime
control, the question is not how governmental entrapment would be
viewed by the majority of citizens who have little propensity to commit
crime regardless of their respect or lack of respect for the police, but by
those on the borderline of criminality. That group likely already has
little respect for the police. Compared with police conduct such as
brutality and racism which affects and disaffects them regularly,
entrapment of the nonpredisposed likely would have little marginal
impact on this group’s respect for the law.
This analysis is bolstered by the conduct of the police themselves.
It seems highly implausible that the police would engage in entrapment
if it had the effect of harming their reputation. The police have a strong
incentive and ability to monitor the public’s perception of them and a
strong incentive to act in ways to protect their reputation. It can
reasonably be inferred from the existence of entrapment that the
police–the group with the most at stake--do not consider it injurious to
their reputation. It is particularly dubious that the police would engage
in entrapment if it led to greater lawlessness because it undermined the
public’s respect for law. In contrast, checks are needed on the types of
unlawful searches police engage in because those clearly prevent crime.
The cost to privacy incurred by unlawful police searches is an
externality of the conduct. Cost in terms of reputation and lawlessness
are internalized even without an entrapment doctrine. Accordingly,
these costs do not provide a viable explanation of the defense.

Exclusionary Rule (1986), reprinted in 22 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 573 (1989) (identifying
juries sympathy with police, not criminals, as a basis of failure to enforce the Fourth
amendment through civil actions).
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4. Net Value of Entrapment
Quantifying the net effects of any proposed rule of law has
always been the bane of utilitarianism. Still, as a broad proposition, it
is hard to doubt that punishing more will deter more. Such an effect is
particularly important in the prevention of so-called victimless crimes,
such as narcotics trafficking and prostitution, where traditional lawenforcement techniques are less effective. Any convictions, even those
of the nonpredisposed, advance the cause of general deterrence.
Furthermore, the police have an inherent interest in not expending
resources where there will be no net reduction in crimes. It may
therefore be presumed that the police would only engage in entrapment
where they had reason to believe significant deterrence would result.127
From the perspective of utilitarianism, punishing the entrapped is
presumptively defensible.
Admittedly, there may be a segment among the nonpredisposed
who react as the Model Penal Code Commentaries predict and view the
practice of government entrapment as “unsavory.” This would not be
surprising given the prevalence of the entrapment defense. However, a
satisfactory theory of entrapment cannot rest on this public perception.
Where a practice is inappropriate, the public often senses this on an
intuitive level. The task of a theory of entrapment is to articulate a
valid basis for this intuition. Thus, the story of the Model Penal Code
thatgovernmental entrapment is viewed by (at least some of) the public
as unsavory is likely correct. However, it cannot be the whole story of
entrapment.
C. Entrapment and Civil Rights
The civil rights theory of entrapment is a prophylactic theory.
According to this theory, there is nothing objectionable in theory about
the government’s entrapping a person; in the typical case, entrapment
acts as a general deterrent of would-be criminals at an acceptable cost
and in a manner consistent with desert-based constraints on
punishment. Proponents of the civil rights theory of entrapment,
however, assert that entrapment carries the potential for significant
abuse.
It has been claimed that “[p]ermitting conviction of
127

See Seidman, The Supreme Court, Entrapment, and Our Criminal Justice
Dilemma, supra note 57, at 144 (“To the extent that entrapment doctrine rests on
efficiency grounds, one would expect the police themselves to be motivated to use
scarce resources in a manner that maximizes the number of criminals apprehended.”).
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nondisposed persons who have been led astray by police may . . . have
a chilling effect upon exercise of political freedoms”128 and that “use of
agents provocateurs to obtain evidence against individuals by inducing
and participating in criminal acts is a feared tool of government
oppression.”129 Entrapment, it is charged, might be used against those
the government disagrees with, undermining the basic civil right of
participation in the political process. Furthermore, there is no practical
way to eliminate this possibility of political targeting short of
establishing an entrapment defense applicable to all governmentally
entrapped. Thus, the defense is arguably needed as a prophylactic to
eliminate the acceptable risk of the government’s turning political
enemies into criminals.
As a theory of the historical basis for the entrapment defense, the
civil rights theory may seem attractive. The entrapment defense is
“virtually unique to the criminal jurisprudence of the United States.”130
Perhaps its recognition in the United States is related to this country’s
unique tradition of respect for civil rights and protection of the political
process. The framers of the Constitution were clearly concerned about
the government’s power to make people into criminals. The purpose of
the Bill of Attainder and the Ex Post Facto clauses was to make sure
this power was not abused.131 Bills of attainder and ex post facto laws
are objectionable because they make liability depend on facts–identity
and past acts–that a person has no reasonable chance to avoid. The use
of inducements powerful enough to qualifying as entrapment
accomplishes the same objectionable result through executive, as
opposed to legislative, action. The entrapment defense thus might be
128

Park, The Entrapment Controversy, supra note 14, at 243. See also MODEL
PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, supra note 6, § 2.13 cmt. at 406 (observing
entrapment “can easily be employed as the expression of personal malice on the part
of the officer”.).
129
Carlson, The Act Requirement and the Foundations of the Entrapment Defense,
supra note 69, at 1012. Carlson also opines absent the entrapment defense, “[t]he
government may attempt to induce nearly anyone, exercising easily corruptible
discretion in choosing targets, without respect for the principle of nondiscretionary
law enforcement . . . .” Id. at 1089.
130
FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 12, at 541.
131
See Akhil Reed Ahmar, The Supreme Court 1999 Term Foreword: The
Document and the Doctrine,114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 102 (2000) (noting that the
singling out known persons for hostile treatment is the obvious concern of the Ex Post
Facto and Bill of Attainder clauses.)
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thought to have grown out of the same political tradition that produced
the Bill of Attainder and Ex Post Facto clauses.132 Furthermore, unlike
government entrapment, private entrapment does not implicate political
process concerns. In contrast to government entrapment, the potential
for one group of private citizens to entrap members of an opposing
group is counterbalanced by the latter group’s equal ability. Thus the
civil rights theory of entrapment provides a solution to the question
why government, but not private entrapment, is a defense.
Two forceful objections may be advanced against the civil rights
theory of entrapment. The first objection is that the potential for abuse
of entrapment is more theoretical rather than practical. There is no
record of entrapment’s having been employed as a weapon against
those the government disfavors.133 Although public figures who are
caught in government sting operations commonly cry that they have
been targeted by their political enemies, such claims rarely have merit.
For example, in ABSCAM, probably the most notorious example of
government agents ensnaring political figures, duped middlemen who
volunteered names of politicians they thought might be open to
dealings with “Arab sheiks.”134 The targets of the investigation were
selected based on this information rather than political affiliation.
Former Mayor of Washington, D.C., Marion Barry was charged with
three felony and ten misdemeanor counts of violating federal drug laws,
132

This historical hypothesis, however, is not supported by the case law. The
seminal Supreme Court entrapment cases, see supra note 4, contain not a hint of the
theory that concern for civil rights and political process underlies the entrapment
defense. In contrast, the Supreme Court has given at least passing acknowledgment
to the view the purpose of the Fourth Amendment’s protection of privacy is to ensure
the integrity of he political system. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 752 (1979)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting in connection challenge to government’s recording
of telephone numbers “individuals, including members of unpopular political
organizations or journalists with confidential sources, may legitimately wish to avoid
disclosure of their personal contacts.”).
133
See Park, The Entrapment Controversy, supra note14, at 237-38 (“Studies of
police behavior have turned up evidence of corruption, brutality, and violations of
constitutional rights, but have not found comparable evidence of entrapment.”).
134
See Final Report of the Select Comm. To Study Undercover Activities of
Components of the Department of Justice, S. Rep. No. 682, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 68299 at 16 (1982); See also Irvin B. Nathan, ABSCAM: A Fair and Effective Method for
Fighting Public Corruption 6-9, printed in ABSCAM ETHICS: MORAL ISSUES AND
DECEPTION IN LAW ENFORCEMENT (Gerald M. Caplan, ed., 1983) (describing
operation of ABSCAM investigation).
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and was convicted on one of the latter after he smoked crack cocaine
with a police agent.135 Although Barry alleged that he was unfairly
targeted by a police investigation,136 evidence of his frequent drug use,
perjury, and corruption made him an appropriate subject of
investigation.137 Of course the absence of cases of entrapment for
political purposes may be explained by the existence of the entrapment
defense, which would render such tactics void. However, the existence
of a legal doctrine annulling the effects of police conduct rarely is
completely effective in eliminating the conduct where the police are
motivated to engage in the conduct. This should not be surprising.
Where the only sanctioned applied to the government is to return it to
the status quo ante, there is no reason for the government not to engage
in the conduct based on the hope that conduct will not be correctly
identified and redressed. The legion of cases identifying violations of
the Fourth Amendment despite the exclusionary rule is ample proof of
this theory. Lack of politically-motivated entrapment cases likely
reflects lack of interest in using entrapment in that manner, as much as
the belief that in some cases, the defense would preclude conviction.
Nor should it be surprising that the government lacks interest in
using entrapment as a political tool. In practice, the government has
more effective ways of oppressing its opponents if it wished to. If
convictions are desired, the government has the simple expedient of
planting of evidence and engaging in perjury. Of course in theory, if
there were no entrapment defense, entrapment would have the
advantage for the government of guaranteeing conviction. Evidence
planting and perjury may be detected. Yet entrapment requires a high
degree of subtlety and precision. Too weak an enticement and it will
not be attractive to a nondisposed target; too high will cause the target
to be suspicious. Evidence planting and perjury is a much more
practical alternative. As the recent events in Tulia, Texas demonstrate,
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B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., Barry Guilty on One Drug Count, Mistrial is
Declared on Felonies, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1990, at A1.
136
B. Drummond Ayers, Jr., Calling His Conviction Part of a Racist Plot, Barry
Starts a Six-Month Prison Term. N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1991, as A16.
137
See Stuart Taylor, Jr. The Barry Sting, THE AMERICAN LAWYER 3, 3 (October
1990) (describing Barry as a person “[a]ny good prosecutor would have wanted to
nail”).
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it is the technique of choice for obtaining convictions of members of
disfavored groups.138
Furthermore, the incarceration of political opponents is often an
unnecessary goal for a government seeking to suppress opposition.
The entrapment defense does not create a legal right not to be
entrapped. Rather, it only creates a defense to criminal liability where
the police have exercised their legal power to entrap. The defense
therefore removes the incentive to entrap only from government agents
who seek to convict their enemies. Those in government who wish to
suppress opposition, however, may be able to achieve their goal
without the conviction of their target. A politician’s career may easily
be destroyed by the publication that he yielded to a temptation, even if
he was not predisposed to so act and even if it is a temptation that a
law-abiding citizen might accept.139 As argued earlier, yielding to
temptation should be regarded as moral failure, even if it a common
failure.140 This point is sharper when applied to public figures and
leaders, who are inevitably held to a higher standard by the average
citizen. Finally, in its bag of dirty tricks, the government has
techniques such as harassment, infiltration, monitoring, and smear
campaigns. These have a proven track-record.141 With strategies such
as these, who needs entrapment?
138

In Tulia, Texas, Thomas Coleman, a lone undercover police officer with little
background in law enforcement, engineered the arrest on drug charges of 46 AfricanAmericans, resulting in the 38 convictions with prison sentences ranging from 20 to
90 years. In the 11 cases the went to trial, all the defendants were found guilty based
entirely on Coleman’s perjured testimony. Lee Hockstader, Washington Post, April
2, 2003, at A3.
139
From 1968 to 1978, forty-eight percent of United States congressmen charged
with bribery or moral violations failed to be re-elected. Peters & Welch, The Effects
of Charges or Corruption on Voting Behavior in Congressional Elections, 74 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 697, 702 (1980). Marion Barry was acquitted of most of the charges
based on his smoking crack cocaine with a government agent. Despite his success in
court, Barry did not seek to be re-elected as the mayor of Washington D.C. See Stuart
Taylor, Jr. The Barry Sting, THE AMERICAN LAWYER 3 (October 1990).
140
See supra § III.2.b-c.
141
Martin Luther King, Jr. is perhaps the best-know example of a target of
government initiated smear campaign. Through the use of wire taps, bugs, and
informants, the Federal Bureau of Investigation likely complied over a million pages
on the activities of King and his associates. The F.B.I. fabricated fake tapes,
disseminated scandalous disinformation, intimidated supporters, and disrupted fund
raising activities. See GERALD D. MCKNIGHT. THE LAST CRUSADE: MARTIN
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Second, it is doubtful that the entrapment defense is needed to
guard against abusive use of persuasive techniques. The Equal
Protection Clause forbids prosecutors from using race or religion as
selection criterion when determining whom to prosecute.142
Prosecuting a person based on his opposition to government policies or
political views also is unconstitutional, violating either the First
Amendment or the Equal Protection Clause.143 There is no reason to
distinguish the constitutionality of selective prosecution on one hand
and selective investigation/entrapment on the other.144 If established, it
should constitute a Fourteenth Amendment violation. Admittedly, it is
difficult to satisfy the proof requirements in analogous cases of
selective prosecution.145 It might therefore be argued that the selective
prosecution defense is an insufficient response to the threat of selective
entrapment. The difficulty in establishing the selective prosecution
defense, however, just reflects the considered judgment that, without a
LUTHER KING, JR., THE FBI, AND THE POOR PEOPLE’S CAMPAIGN 5-6, 26-27 (1998).
The F.B.I. also conducted “counterintelligence” activities designed to destroy the
reputations and careers of those suspected of being communists. See Kenneth
O’Reilly, Hoover and the Un-Americans: The FBI, HUAC, and the Red Menace 20014 (noting the FBI’s COINTELPRO program carried out over 2000 disruptive
actions). For examples of partisan political intelligence gathered by wiretaps and
other means during the Nixon Administration, the reader is referred to Senate Select
Comm. to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities and
the Rights of Americans, S. Rep. No. 755, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., bk. II, at 235-37
(1976).
142
United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996); United States v. Batchelder,
442 U.S. 114 (1979); Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962).
143
See, e.g., United States v. Crowthers, 456 F.2d 1074 (4th Cir. 1972)
(permitting discovery on claim by war protestors that prosecution was intended to
inhibit the expression of viewpoint). See also WAYNE LAFAVE, ET AL., CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 682 (3d ed. 2000) (noting that political activity or membership in a
political party has been held an impermissible ground for selection for prosecution).
144
See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1986) (racially motivated enforcement
of facially neutral law violates Equal Protection Clause).
145
In United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996), the Supreme Court
considered the claims of Black defendant indicted for selling cocaine that they were
selectively prosecuted based on their race. Denying their claims, the Court held
before being entitled to discovery on the issue, a defendant must produce credible
evidence that similarly situated defendants of other races could have been prosecuted.
Id. at 470. Furthermore, assuming this threshold can be met, in order to prevail on a
selective prosecution claim, defendant must establish by clear and convincing
evidence that the prosecution had a discriminatory effect and purpose. Id. at 465.
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sufficient showing, it is too costly to society to require the prosecution
to respond to charges that the decision to prosecute was improperly
motivated.146 The entrapment defense is not a reasonable solution to
the problem of improperly motivated targeting of a person because it
permits even those who were not improperly targeted to assert the
claim if there is some evidence the requirements of the defense are
satisfied. A more sensible solution to the problem of improperly
motivated investigation would be to lower the standard of proof in
selection. The entrapment defense, construed as a device to prevent the
possibility of politically motivated entrapment, therefore cannot be
justified.
D. Entrapment and Autonomy
The civil rights theory of entrapment was based on the notion that
a potentially useful tool of law enforcement was fatally flawed by the
possibility of misuse. In contrast, the personal autonomy theory
maintains that entrapment is intrinsically wrong. According to this
theory, the core wrong of entrapment cannot be explained in terms of
violating the traditional limitations retributivism imposes on the
government’s power to punish. Instead appeal must be made to a
distinct and independent norm: the principle of personal autonomy.
Because entrapment violates this principle, an entrapped person should
not be criminally liable.
Professor Carlson advocates the personal autonomy theory of
entrapment. Carlson believes that entrapment can be understood in
light of the criminal law’s act requirement. It is well established that an
“act”is required for criminal liability.147 Carlson agrees with Herbert
Packer that the act requirement protects the “capacity of the individual
human being to live his life in a reasonable freedom from socially
imposed external constraints by defining ‘a point of no return beyond
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See id. at 468 (identifying costs in refuting claim of selective prosecution as
diversion of prosecutorial resources and possible of disclosure of prosecutorial
strategy).
147
See LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 5, § 3.2(b). Here “acts,” include
breaches of legal duties, though action or omission, regardless whether a bodily
movement is involved. Id.
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which [such] external constraints may be imposed.’”148 In this manner,
“[t]he acts requirement shields ‘people’s thoughts and emotions . . . ,
personality patterns and character structures’ from government
scrutiny, and protects personal autonomy.”149 In other words, requiring
an act for liability ensures that persons will have a safe harbor–thoughts
alone and most omissions–which they may occupy with complete
security and freedom from government interference.
The same respect for personal autonomy, Carlson believes,
underlies the entrapment defense. Carlson writes:
When the government encourages crime, it
directly and prematurely infringes on the realm
that the act requirement is designed to protect
from government intervention; the government
uses its power to affect an individual’s choice
and behavior before the individual has done
anything to warrant an invasion of his
autonomy.150
On this basis, Carlson concludes:
The
most
objectionable
feature
of
encouragement . . . is that the government, by
using encouragement, is no longer in a neutral
position vis-a-vis its citizens and the choice that
they make. Rather than giving an individual full
freedom to comply with the law, and thereby
respecting the individual’s autonomy and ability
to avoid crime, by offering the encouragement
the government tries . . . to persuade the
individual to violate the law. By manipulating
the array of choices facing the individual,
encouragement saps the individual’s ability to
resist crime and to avoid punishment. . . . .
[Encouragement]
circumvents
[the
act
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Carlson, The Act Requirement and the Foundation of the Entrapment Defense,
supra note 69, at 1083 (quoting HERBERT PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL
SANCTION 75 (1968)).
149
See id. at 1083.
150
See id. at 1084 (footnotes omitted).
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requirement’s] restraint on the state’s intrusive
powers.151
Carlson identifies a disquieting aspect to entrapment. The point
might be made by an analogy to a defendant’s creating the conditions
of his own defense. As a general principle of criminal law, a defense is
unavailable if the actor has created the conditions necessary for
establishing it in order to avoid liability.152 Although this principle is
not
recognized in its general form, many defenses include
qualifications consistent with this principle. For example, intoxication
may be a defense to certain crimes, but not when it is self-induced for
the purpose of avoiding liability.153 Likewise, defense of duress is
unavailable when the actor has unreasonably exposed himself to the
situation of duress.154 These instances show that the law will not let its
prohibitions be circumvented by strategic conduct by a defendant who
has created the condition of his own defense. In this light, entrapment
might be characterized as the government’s creating the conditions of
the defendant’s liability. Rather than waiting for the person to
autonomously breach the rules, the government acts strategically in
violation of established limitations of personal autonomy. As Carlson
writes, “[E]ncouragement is clearly intended to circumvent, not honor,
the act requirement’s core principle that a criminal sanction will be
imposed only in response to past criminal behavior.”155
The critical issue in evaluating Carlson’s personal autonomy
theory of the entrapment defense is whether entrapment is an
illegitimate impingement upon autonomy and individual freedom.
There is, of course, no general right to be free of government influence
until the point where one commits a criminal act. Arguably the primary
purpose of the criminal law is to establish an incentive system to
strongly influence the choices people make and to guide their conduct.
Deterring a person from an immoral act is surely a legitimate
151

See id. at 1086-87 (footnote omitted).
See Paul Robinson, Causing the Conditions of One's Own Defense: A Study in
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See LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 5, § 9.5(g) at 480-81; Model Penal
Code § 2.08.
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See LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 5, § 9.7(b) nn. 39-40; Model Penal
Code § 2.08
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interference with an individual’s decision making. Furthermore, the
government may sometimes encourage people to engage in conduct
that it believes is not in their objective interest. The government may
encourage people to spend their limited resources on lottery tickets or
to enlist in the armed forces where they risk death on the battle field.
More to the point, the government may take measures that push people
toward crime. The government may incarcerate a person knowing that
his exposure to other criminals will increase the chance of his
recidivism,156 or adopt economic policies that predictably increase the
unemployment rate, reducing people to poverty that “drives” them into
crime. The government may even directly offer strong incentives to
engage in a specific criminal act to those who are predisposed (under
the subjective version of entrapment) or, at least, lesser incentives
(under the objective version) to criminal conduct. These measures are
permissible, even though the government is very often not, in Carlson’s
language, in “neutral position vis-a-vis its citizens and the choice that
they make.” In these cases, the government typically hopes the bait
will be taken. Acceptable practices, therefore display this “most
objectionable feature.”
Given that some impingement upon with personal autonomy is
acceptable, the question is whether it is plausible to assert that
entrapment should be a defense because of the degree of interference.
Is the line that separates permissible from impermissible impingements
from the perspective of personal autonomy roughly the line between
entrapment and inducements not amounting to entrapment? It is
difficult to answer this question because Carlson’s discussion sheds
little light on the line between permissible and impermissible
impingements on personal autonomy. One obvious place to draw the
line with respect to governmental influence of decision-making is at the
point where the actor’s decision to engage in crime ceases to be
autonomous–where the actor is not to blame for the decision. The
government’s brainwashing of a person to commit a crime would
undoubtedly be an improper interference with autonomy, justifying
exoneration to deter future brainwashing. As argued previously,
however, a person who is entrapped is still fully culpable for his
156

See Joan Petersilia, et al., Prison Versus Probation in California_Implications
for Crime and Offender Recidivism, 150 PRACTICING L. INST. 105 (1989) (1,022person study prepared for the Department of Justice indicating that, compared to
probation, imprisonment increases the rate of recidivism among felons).
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conduct.157 Being enticed to crime by an appealing offer is not
analogous to brainwashing precisely because we believe a person
should be able to resist such pressures. This culpability implies that
decision to engage in criminal conduct in light of the inducement was
autonomous. Contrary to Carlson’s claim, even entrapped persons
have “full freedom to comply with the law.” Given culpability, there
is little room to argue that an entrapped person’s autonomy was
improperly interfered with.
Finally, Carlson’s theory only offers a partial solution to the
problem of why the entrapment defense does not apply to cases of
private entrapment. An explanation might begin with the following
reasonable point: recognizing the defense when a government agent
engages in what amounts to improper interference is justified because
the defense eliminates the incentive to interfere; in contrast, because
few private persons who convince others to engage in crime do it so
that the other may be arrested and convicted, recognizing the defense in
cases of private entrapment would have no deterrent effect on private
entrappers. Nevertheless, if private entrapment, like government
entrapment, constituted an improper interference with a person’s
decision-making (that is, a wrong to the person entrapped), one would
expect either criminal liability over and above accomplice liability or
civil liability in the form of a tort claim in order to deter such private
activity. Neither exists. There is neither a crime nor tort of entrapping
(over and above accomplice liability). Without further elaboration,
Carlson’s theory does not account for the government actor aspect of
the entrapment defense.
IV. Entrapment as Unfairness
This section of the Article presents a new theory of entrapment.
Like the civil rights theory and the personal autonomy theory of the
previous section, the theory of this section asserts that punishment is
not necessarily justified if it merely satisfies the requirements of
traditional utilitarianism and retributivism. Rather, according to this
theory, in addition to meeting these requirements, punishment must be
imposed fairly–a condition elaborated and applied to entrapment below.

157

See supra § II.A.2.
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A. Unfairness Explained
As a conceptual matter, justice is a principle for guiding, or a
standard for assessing, for the conduct of persons or institutions. It has
been described as the first goal of social institutions.158 Justice purports
to trump, or at least constrain, the government’s pursuit of other ends,
such as advancing the general welfare.159 Despite its significance,
justice is not a unitary concept. Norms of corrective and commutative
justice, for example, are based on different intuitions about what is
morally appropriate and apply in different, although sometimes
overlapping, contexts.160 Justice has many branches, or aspects.
In the context of the criminal law, justice is usually thought of in
terms of retributive justice.161 Although there are many conceptions of
retributivism, they all justify harsh treatment of an actor as an
intrinsically morally appropriate or permissible response to actor’s
wrongful conduct toward his victim.162 For punishment to be just,
there must be the appropriate relation between the person to be
158

See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 3 (2d ed. 1971); see also THE
FEDERALIST no. 51, at 358 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed., 1961)
(“Justice is the end of government. It is the end of civil society.”).
159
See RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 158, at 3-4; MICHAEL J.
SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 3, 14 (1982).
160
See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF LEGAL THOUGHT 80-81
(1996) (describing corrective justice as responding to disturbances of initially just
distributions and commutative as responding to inequality that might result in
exchanging goods). The basic categories of justice can be traces back to the works of
Aristotle. See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, bk. V, chs. 2-5, in 9 THE BASIC WORKS
OF ARISTOTLE (Richard McKeon ed., Sir W. David Ross trans. 1941).
161
See, e.g., MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL
LAW, supra note 66, Part I (1997) (arguing criminal law best understood as
embodying retributive justice norm); David Dolinko, Three Mistakes of Retributivism,
39 UCLA L. REV. 1623, 1623 (1992) (claiming that retributivism "has enjoyed in
recent years so vigorous a revival that it can fairly be regarded today as the leading
philosophical justification of the institution of criminal punishment").
162
Some offenses, such as prostitution, are sometimes described as “victimless.”
Upon further inspection, however, victimless crimes are thought to actually or
potentially interfere will an interest of society, such has the interest in public morals
or health and safety. It is difficult to imagine an actual offense that cannot be justified
along these lies. Furthermore, social interests may be analyzed in terms of the
interests of the person, actual or future, that comprise society. See JOEL FEINBERG,
THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (1984) (following John Stuart Mill in
asserting that criminal prohibitions are justified only insofar as they protect legitimate
interests of others).
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punished and the actual or potential victim. For this reason, retributive
justice might fall within the general category of “interactive justice.”163
Some theorists also assert that the concept of punishment involves a
third entity: an authority to establish the rules and to exact the
punishment.164 With respect to criminal justice, that entity would be
the government. In any case, whether retributive justice is thought of
as involving a two-place relation of wrongdoer and victim, or a threeplace relation among wrongdoer, victim and government, retributive
justice focuses narrowly on a relatively limited number of entities as
they interact on a particular occasion.
In contrast, distributive justice has a much wider focus.
Distributive justice relates to how benefits and burdens attendant to
membership or participation in a collective group, such as a community
or nation, should be allocated across that group.165 An example of a
theory of distributive justice is Rawls’s difference principle. According
to this principle, a social system will be deemed just to the extent its
institutions maximize the welfare of the least well-off members of
society, that is, raises the tail end of the wealth distribution curve.166
This principle is a principle of distributive justice because what one
person is due under it is in part a function of what others are due under
it. Whether it is distributively just to levy a tax on the wealthy or to
grant the wealthy a tax cut depends on the effect of the levy or cut on
the poor. In contrast, the principle that social institutions should
impose burdens that reflect the wrongful conduct of each member of
the society would be a principle that sounds in retributive justice.
Burdens for every person are defined independently. Tort claims have
been evaluated against principles of distributive justice.167 With
163

See Richard W. Wright, The Principles of Justice, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1859, 1883 (2000) (dividing forms of justice into “interactive” and “distributive”).
164
See H.L.A. Hart, Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment, in
PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 5 (1968).
165
See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 166-67 (1980).
166
See RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 158, at 75-80.
167
See JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS, 350-54 (1992) (justifying
corrective aspects of tort law in part as preserving second-best distributions of
resources); Alan L.
Calnan, Distributive and Corrective Justice Issues in
Contemporary Tobacco Litigation, 27 SW. U. L. REV. 577, 613-22, 633-41 (1998)
(considering whether regulatory controls and tort actions against tobacco companies
were consistent with resource allocations based on risk and need); See also FINNIS,
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limited exceptions,168 however, considerations of distributive justice
have not been thought relevant in the context of criminal justice.
Fairness, as explained below, is an aspect of distributive justice.
The meaning of fairness is not well-settled. It is a term
acknowledged to have many senses.169 Legal doctrines of fair use, fair
play, fair warning, and fair dealing, for example, all rest on slightly
different sets of policy concerns and moral considerations. Because it
has no rigid definition, it is not unfair to press “fairness” into service
again. For the purpose of this Article, “fairness” shall be defined by
reference to the following principle:
Fairness Principle
A government practice imposing burdens in
order to achieve a general social good is fair
only if the burdens are imposed pursuant to a
policy to allocate such burdens generally among
those expected to benefit from the practice.
A government practice is unfair, and hence improper, if it violates this
principle. The principle here is stated with a degree of abstractness to
permit different conceptions of what allocation policies are fair. For
example, under one conception of fairness, fairness would require
highways–a general social good–to be paid for by a fixed tax on all
drivers; under another, by tolls, a method that would result in some
drivers paying more than others. The fairness principle is obviously a
matter of distributive justice because it concerns the assigning of
burdens associated with the advancement of the common good. The

NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS, supra note 165, at 180-181 (discussing
distributive justice norms in personal injury litigation).
168
See Sherry F. Colb, Crying Murder When A Woman Refuses a C_Section: The
Disturbing Implications of a Utah Prosecution, FindLaw's Legal Commentary, at
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/colb/20040316.html (March 18, 2004) (arguing
traditional duty-to-aid rules, if applied women carrying fetuses, unfairly burden
women); Alon Harel and Gideon Parchomovsky, On Hate and Equality, 109 YALE L.
J. 507 (1999) (arguing that bias crimes unfairly distribute cost of crime occurrence on
minorities).
169
See Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L.
REV. 961, 1003 n.84 (2001) (noting “fairness has many different meanings, some of
which stand apart from, and are opposed to, individuals' well_being”); Philip
Giordano, Invoking Law as a Basis for Identity in Cyberspace, 1998 STAN. TECH. L.
REV. 1, 69 (1998) (“‘Fairness” has many meanings in the real world.”).
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burden shouldered by one person will be in part a function of the
burden shouldered by others.
The notion of fairness defined above should have an air to it of
familiarity. Fairness is the principle that underlies much of the Takings
Clause jurisprudence. The Takings Clause forbids the government
from taking private property for public use unless just compensation is
paid. Thus, for example, absent payment, the government may not
simply seize the property of a single landowner and convert that
property into a public park. A court might explain that one person
should not have to bear the burden of providing a benefit to be enjoyed
by all.170 Rather than singling out one person to bear the entire burden,
the government could have caused the burden to be shared more widely
through a tax increase to pay compensation to the evicted landowner.
Accordingly, under the terminology of this Article, the government’s
appropriation of the property without compensation would be regarded
as unfair. Likewise, regulatory restrictions not consistent with fairness
seem objectionable. If the government were to require owners of only
Fords to equip their cars with special pollution control devices, Ford
owners could legitimately complain that the cost of improved air
quality was unfairly, hence improperly, being placed on their shoulders.
Bills of attainder, which imposed criminal sanctions on specifically
identified individuals, are prohibited by the Constitution.171 A Bill of
Attainder would be paradigmatically unfair because the burden it
imposes is not generally allocated under any interpretation of
“fairness.”172
170

See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (stating that one of the
principal purposes of the Takings Clause is "to bar Government from forcing some
people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne
by the public as a whole."); see also, Nollan v. California Coastal Com'n, 483 U.S.
825, 836 n.4 (U.S.1987) (noting that if the plaintiffs “were being singled out to bear
the burden of California's attempt to remedy these problems . . . the State's action,
even if otherwise valid, might violate either the incorporated Takings Clause . . . .”);
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 605 (2d 1988) (“[T]he just
compensation requirement [of the Takings Clause] appears to express a limit on the
government’s power to isolate particular individuals for sacrifice for the general
good.”).
171
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3, § 10, cl 1.
172
See Akhil Amar, Atainder and Amendment 2: Romer’s Rightness, 95 MICH. L.
REV. 203, 235 (1996) (noting that bills of attainder offend, inter alia, rule of law
notions of generality).
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B. Entrapment and Unfairness
The principle of fairness readily applies to matters of crime
prevention. To take a well-known example, even facing an unsolved
series of high-profile crimes, the government should not frame an
innocent person. Such an action might be justified on utilitarian
grounds because it would convince would-be criminals of the
effectiveness of the police, dissipate public anxiety, and deter
vigilantism.173 The result has traditionally been explained on the
ground that framing an innocent person offends retributive justice.174
The impropriety of framing an innocent person, however, may also be
explained by reference to the principle of fairness. “Why,” the framed
person might ask, “should I be the one selected to be framed? I am just
one of the much larger group of persons who have no culpable
connection to the crime. Why has the burden been placed on my
shoulders?” The moral arbitrariness of the police’s swooping down on
an innocent person and stigmatizing him as a criminal is a second
reason why the practice is so intuitively disagreeable.
Furthermore, there are intuitively objectionable matters relating to
crime prevention that cannot be explained by appeal to retributive
justice. Consider a case where all police activities are funded by a
special tax. If the local government arbitrarily selected a single
mem
ber of the community and imposed the entire tax burden on him,
this action would not offend principles of retributive justice. Imposing
the disproportionate tax would not be a matter of punishment without
culpability, and contrary to retributivism, because it would not be a
matter of punishment in the first place. Punishment typically, perhaps

173

It has been disputed whether utilitarianism would justify the framing of a
innocent person in the real world. See, e.g., Guyora Bender, Framed: Utilitarianism
and the Punishment of the Innocent 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 132-46 (2000); John Rawls,
Two Concepts of Rules, 44 PHIL. REV. 3, 11-12 (1955). Nevertheless, there is no
doubt that as a conceptual matter utilitarianism might justify such action.
174
See H.J. McCloskey, A Non-Utilitarian Approach to Punishment, 9 INQUIRY
249 (1965); H.J. McCloskey, An Examination of Restricted Utilitarianism, 66 PHIL.
REV. 466 (1957). As noted supra text accompanying note 68, retributivism requires
the appropriate relation between subject of punishment and an actual or potential
victim in order for punishment to be justified. The punishment of a person who has
been framed by the government would be considered unjust because the requisite
causal or culpable relation between the defendant and the victim is absent.
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inherently, involves stigmatization or condemnation.175 Although it is
disagreeable to be taxed, it is neither stigmatizing nor condemnatory.
Culpability, which is a requisite for punishment, is not a requirement
for taxation. Yet such a tax would violate the fairness principle. A tax
to fund the police is most appropriately levied on the community as a
whole because all in the community potentially benefit from the
protection provided by the police.176 Although the need to raise the tax
revenue may be great, there is no reason why the burden could not be
spread more generally through an increase in income or sales taxes. To
impose the whole tax on one person would be to make him shoulder a
disproportionate part of the burden of subsidizing police activities and
make him the target of arbitrary government action. The same analysis
would apply if the government seized one person’s house and
converted it to the local police station without paying just
compensation to the house owner. This would be a clear violation of
the Takings Clause.
The analysis of entrapment from the perspective of fairness flows
quickly from these examples. Expressed baldly, entrapment is
analogous to the random selection of a person to be taxed to support
police activities or the appropriation of a person’s home to serve as a
police station. The analogy has four aspects to it. First, entrapping a
person produces a social benefit enjoyed by all–increased crime
prevention. As discussed previously, the entrapping of a person may
serve to deter generally those would-be criminals in doubt of the
government’s resources, commitment and capability to root out
potential evil. The conviction of an entrapped person thus advances the
general social goal of crime prevention like an increase in police patrols
funded by a disproportionate tax or a better- outfitted police station
located in a citizen’s former home.

175

See JOEL FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF
RESPONSIBILITY 98 (1970) (“[P]unishment is a conventional device for the
expression of attitudes of resentment and indignation, and of judgments of
disapproval and reprobation, on the part either of the punishing authority . . . or of
those 'in whose name' the punishment is inflicted.”); Joel Feinberg, The Expressive
Function of Punishment, 49 MONIST 397 (1965), reprinted in DOING AND DESERVING,
id.
176
The tax might be applied progressively on the reasonable assumption that
progressive taxation is consistent with distributive justice.
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Second, the nature of the burden imposed is similar. Being
targeted for entrapment is not in itself stigmatizing. A person who is
entrapped is, under the subjective version of entrapment, by definition a
law-abiding citizen, or at least, under the objective version, not
necessarily a person ready and willing to commit a crime. Being
targeted for entrapment is thus not akin to being punished.
Accordingly, it is not something that requires culpability.
Nevertheless, being targeted for entrapment is potentially burdensome
because of the consequences. It is like being subjected to a tax or a
taking that, while not punitive, is still oppressive. The only difference
is that, rather than money or property, however, it is liberty that is
being unjustly appropriated.
Third, those selected for entrapment are arbitrary members of a
larger group. Often it will just be the play of chance that will cause a
person to be targeted for entrapment. There may be many with
attenuated connections to crime who could be lured into it. It will just
be bad luck that a police informant who has an incentive to entrap
happens to know the individual, or that among the many susceptible
individuals known by the informant, he chooses to pursue one in
particular. Likewise, it may be pure coincidence that an undercover
police officer posing as a prostitute approaches one driver stopped at a
stop sign to solicit money for sex rather than another driver.177 There
may be numerous persons who would be willing to buy $870 worth of
food stamps for $140. When one such person is selected to be induced
to crime because he happens to be running an ongoing yard sale, the
selection is essentially arbitrary.178 In Jacobson, the Supreme Court
downplayed the defendant’s initial ordering of a lawful publication of
nude youths, finding that it only indicated “a generic inclination to act
within a broad range, not all of which is criminal.”179 Many people
have such a generic inclination. In this light, Jacobson’s selection as a
target for encouragement was without justification. As a general
matter, because the entrapment defense typically arises in cases of

177

See Ferge v. State 764 N.E.2d 268 (Ind. App. 2002) (finding entrapment as a
matter of law on similar facts).
178
See People v. Boabley, 493 N.E.2d 369 (App. Ill. 1986) (finding entrapment
as a matter of law under similar facts).
179
See Jacobson v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1535, 1541 (1992).
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persons who are not predisposed to crime,180 their selection from the
general populace of nonpredisposed persons entails arbitrariness.
Fourth, there will usually be more equitable alternatives available
for spreading the burden of increasing deterrence. An increase in
general deterrence can usually be achieved through increasing patrol or
other traditional reactive law enforcement activities. These increased
activities can be funded through general taxation of the population.
Thus, rather than being concentrated on an arbitrarily chosen member
of the populace, the populace as a whole will bear the burden necessary
to achieve a generally lower rate of crime. Alternatively, and perhaps
more controversially, increased deterrence could also be achieved in a
second more equitable way: launching an exponentially more
aggressive and wide-spread campaign of entrapment. In such a
hypothetical world, the complete exoneration of those entrapped would
not be justified under the unfairness theory because the burden would
not have been disproportionally imposed. This conclusion, however, is
not tantamount to the approval of entrapment. Because a wide-spread
campaign of entrapment would entail the increased likelihood of being
entrapped, in order to achieve the desired level of deterrence, the
penalty for those entrapped could be made correspondingly light.
Those entrapped, while not being able to claim they were treated
unfairly, would enjoy at least a substantial mitigation of their penalty.
A defacto entrapment defense would exist.
Entrapment as unfairness may be understood in light of the
philosopher Gerald Dworkin’s views on entrapment. Dworkin sees in
entrapment a type of conceptual incoherence.181 On one hand, the law
is a system of sanctions providing citizens with reasons to obey it; on
the other hand, agents of the government are providing reasons to
breach it. Nevertheless, Dworkin recognizes that:
It is not always incoherent to invite someone to
do the very act which one is trying to get them
to avoid doing. Consider a parent trying to
teach a child not to touch a stove. In the case of
a particularly recalcitrant child the most effect
180

Lack of predisposition is a formal requirement of the subjection version of the
defense, see supra note 16, and a common feature of cases satisfying the objective
version., see text accompanying note 63, supra.
181
See Gerald Dworkin, The Serpent Beguiled Me and I Did Eat: Entrapment and
the Creation of Crime, 4 LAW AND PHIL. 17, 32 (1985).

UNRAVELING UNLAWFUL ENTRAPMENT

62

technique might be to encourage the child to
touch the stove in one’s presence. The slight
pain now will teach the child to avoid the
greater pain later.182
Dworkin then remarks:
But this is surely not the model being used by
the police. They are interested in deterring
others or in punishing guilty people. The end
being served is not that of the person being
invited to commit the crime.183
Dworkin’s claim that entrapment is conceptually incoherent thus
reduces to the point that the end entrapment serves is that of the general
welfare, not the person entrapped. This objection has a Kantian ring to
it: one person is being used for the benefit of others rather than being
treated an end himself.184 But it is implausible to maintain that one
should never be used for the benefit of others. In any progressive tax
system that funds general services, the wealthy are taxed for the good
of the poor. More to the point, we might imagine a school for
recalcitrant children where it is common that one child is selected and
invited to engage in the forbidden behavior (taunting an aggressive
animal, eating too much ice cream, neglecting to study for an
examination) so that a lesson might be learned by his peers. The
practices of such a school would not be more objectionable than
Dworkin’s example of the child encouraged to touch the hot stove for
his own benefit. Over time, the burden of being made an example
might be broadly shared by the children of the school. Thus, over the
long run, those who bear the cost of the system would enjoy the benefit
of it. Despite the fact that persons are being used as means to an end
(at least if every instance is considered discretely), a school’s adopting
of such a practice is not intuitively objectionable. To the extent that
burdens are fairly shared, using a person for the benefit of others seems
acceptable. The problem with entrapment is exactly that this sharing of
burdens does not occur.
182

Id. at 32-33.
Id. at 32.
184
IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 429 (L.
Beck trans. 1959) (describing the categorical imperative as the requirement “to treat
humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and
never as a means only").
183
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In sum, government entrapment in the absence of the entrapment
defense is offensive because it places significant burdens on a small,
arbitrary segment of the law-abiding public. This result is inherent in
the practice. The segment entrapped must be small because no society
can function if most of its members are incarcerated at any given point.
As discussed earlier, it is conceivable that a society might widely apply
some extremely minor sanctions to individuals who are entrapped.
Such a society would be analogous to the school imagined above and
would be consistent with fairness. But this society would amount to
one with a functional entrapment defense because no significant
penalties would be imposed in cases of entrapment. Accordingly, in
any plausible society lacking a functional entrapment defense,
entrapment will violate the fairness principle.
C. Possible Objections
This section of the Article considers possible objections to the
unfairness theory of entrapment. As discussed, entrapment offends the
fairness principle. The general form of the objections to the unfairness
theory of entrapment is that the fairness principle is itself implausible.
According to these objections, intuitively acceptable practices violate
it. Therefore the principle must be rejected, at least in its unqualified
form.
1. Unfairness and the Problem of Private Entrapment
This Article began by asking why should the law distinguish
government and private entrapment. Any theory of entrapment that
seeks to explain the existing contours of the defense (as opposed to
radically reforming the defense), should show why convicting the
privately entrapped is acceptable, as well as showing why the
convicting of the governmentally entrapped is not.
The fairness principle, it might be charged, goes too far because
under it, the conviction of privately entrapped persons is unfair, and
hence unjust. Imagine this case:
Susan has no criminal record. She works at a
fast food restaurant. She takes hydrocodone, a
pain medication for a physical ailment. Her
supervisor knows of her use. The supervisor
claims to have a friend who is very sick and
needs the medication. When Susan offers to
give the friend her medication, the supervisor
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suggests Susan needs the money and she
convinces her to accept a payment of $5.00
per tablet.
Susan sells the friend some
medication, and after continued pressuring
from her supervisor does it again. She is
arrested and charged with sale of the
hydrocodone.
If Susan’s supervisor is a police informant and the “friend” a detective,
Susan would likely be able to establish entrapment as a matter of
law.185 Susan could validly complain that she had been treated
unfairly. After all, there are likely many people in like circumstances
who are similarly susceptible to inducements Susan was subjected to.
To convict her but not others would be to place a disproportionate share
on the burden of deterring drug trafficking on her shoulders. Would
Susan have a similarly valid complaint of being treated unfairly if the
supervisor and friend were not government agents? From her
perspective of the defendant it “feels” the same whether he has been
entrapped by the government or another citizen. In both cases, she has
been arbitrarily selected from an equally susceptible group and, as a
result, faces a significant loss of freedom.
It is morally significant that, in cases of private entrapment, the
government is not responsible for the arbitrary selection. Rather than
arbitrarily selecting an individual, the government in convicting a
privately entrapped person is merely acting on the general principle that
all persons who have culpably committed wrong should be punished.
The fairness principle, in this respect, is like many common principles
of morality and law that distinguish between:
(1) Acting in an improper manner M which
results in a harm H being imposed on person
P, and,
(2) Imposing a harm H on person P as a result
of another’s acting in an improper manner
M.
The former is prima facie impermissible; the latter permissible.186 For
example, it would be unjust for a landlord to enter P’s apartment
185

See Dial v. Florida, 799 So.2d 407 (Ct. App. Fla. 2001) (finding entrapment as
a matter of law under similar facts).
186
Principles such as the one above are described as deontological or, perhaps
more accurately, agent-relative. See Michael Moore, Victims and Retribution, A
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without permission, burn the money P was planning on using to pay the
rent, and then evict P for failure to pay rent. However, if a third party
destroyed P’s money, the landlord may treat P like any other indigent
person and justly evict P for failure to pay rent. Because the landlord in
the latter hypothetical did not cause P to become indigent, the landlord
may abide by his general practice of evicting those who fail to pay their
rent. Under principles of corrective justice, the landlord is responsible
for correcting only the results of his own wrongdoing, for example, by
excusing P from paying one month’s rent. Likewise, to take an
example from positive law, the Equal Protection Clause prohibits the
government from denying a person employment based on her race. If a
person, however, has suffered private employment discrimination
resulting in her lacking significant job experience, the government can
refuse to hire the person based on her lack of experience.187 From the
perspective of the wronged individual, it feels the same: objectionable
treatment (theft, discrimination) resulting in a relative disadvantage
(eviction, unemployment). The difference is whether the entity in a
position to alleviate the disadvantage or cause an additional one is the
entity responsible for the initial mistreatment. Only where that is the
case can the person validly complain about the entity’s action. Because
in cases of private entrapment the government was not responsible for
the arbitrary selection, it may follow its general policy of punishing
culpable wrongdoers.
Taxation provides a particularly germane example. It is unfair
and improper for the government to select a person to be taxed based
Reply to Professor Fletcher, 3 BUFF. CRIM, L. REV. 65, 70 (1999) (discussing
concepts). A common example is the obligation to keep promises. We are morally
obliged to keep the promises we make. However, we are not obliged to help others
keep their promises, nor alleviate the consequences of promises others have broken.
In
this
way
deontological/agent-relative
principles
differ
from
consequentialist/maximizing principles such as utilitarianism.
187
A plaintiff must show discriminatory purpose to establish an Equal Protection
claim, see Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976) (announcing “the basic
equal protection principle that invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially
discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose”). In
Davis, the Supreme Court permitted the use of a police department application test
that Blacks failed at a disproportionate rate because of their weak language skills.
The fact that this low skill level was likely the effect of attending substandard
segregated schools, and hence, reinforced the effects of past discrimination, did not
influence the Court. See LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra
note 170, at 1511 (criticizing decision).
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on a morally arbitrary characteristic, for example, being seated at the
end of a bar in a local nightclub. However, it is neither unfair nor
improper for the government to impose a tax based on a morally
relevant characteristic, such as net income. This is true even if it is
morally arbitrary that a person happens to possess that characteristic,
for example, by winning a large promotion prize based on a random
drawing. Likewise, it is unfair and improper for the government to
target for entrapment the person who happens to be seated at the end of
bar in a local nightclub, while it is acceptable to prosecute and convict
someone who others have arbitrarily caused to have the morally
relevant characteristic of criminal culpability, for example through
private entrapment. The following chart compares the previous three
hypotheticals:
Entity
Imposing
Burden

Burden
Imposed

Moral Status
of Imposing
Burden

Government

Tax

Fair

Private Party Location at Government
Nightclub

Incarceration

Fair

Government

Incarceration

Unfair

Entity
Arbitrarily
Selecting

Criterion
of
Selection

Private Party Lottery
Number

Location at Government
Nightclub

As indicated, imposing a disadvantage is only unfair when the entity
imposing it is responsible for the initial arbitrary selection.
2. Fairness and General Law Enforcement Activity
A second possible objection to the fairness theory of entrapment
is that the fairness principle, if valid, would bar much police activity
and many convictions that are both clearly legal and intuitively
acceptable.
Consider, for example, the arbitrary decision of the police to
patrol one among many neighborhoods one evening, resulting in the
apprehension of a burglar. Undoubtedly, there are many other burglars
equally deserving of arrest and conviction who are not arrested. Can
the apprehended burglar argue that convicting him would be unfair?
After all, although he has not been personally selected from all others
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burglars to be apprehended, the bottom line is the same. Because
standard reactive crime detection practices are not completely effective,
he, as one among many situated burglars, will have to bear a
disproportionate burden of advancing general deterrence. Likewise,
consider encouragement of criminal conduct by the police that does not
rise to the level of entrapment. It is well established that there is no
entrapment if a police officer simply approaches a person–even without
probable cause–and offers to buy a quantity of illegal narcotics at their
street price.188
Such police conduct, to be distinguished from
inducements powerful enough to support a finding of entrapment, may
be called “opportunity providing.” Yet, so goes the objection, would
not convicting the defendant who has seized the opportunity provided
for crime violate the fairness principle? After all, there are undoubtedly
many drug dealers who would have accepted the offer and he has been
forced to bear a burden which should be more fairly distributed.
In response to the objection based on standard reactive crime
detection practices, such as patrolling one among many areas, it may be
replied that these practices do not create a disproportionate burden on
those they apprehend to the extent that entrapment does. The
proportion of criminals who are currently apprehended through
standard police practices is approximately twenty percent.189 In
contrast, the proportion of nonpredisposed person who are entrapped is
vanishingly small. Like most moral principles, unfairness is a matter of
degree. To be entrapped is many times more unfair than to be
apprehended through standard reactive crime detection practices.
A second distinction may be drawn between entrapment and
standard reactive crime detection practices which, as discussed above,
fail to spread the burden of crime control across the population of all
188

Under the subjective version of entrapment, if the offer is accepted, the
defendant’s predisposition will be established, see State v. Duncan, 330 S.E.2d 481,
488 (N.C. App. 1985) (“Predisposition may be shown by a defendant’s ready
compliance, acquiesce in, or willingness to cooperate in the criminal plan where the
police merely afforded the defendant an opportunity to commit the crime.”) Under
the objective version, the conduct of the police would not be found sufficient to
induce a law-abiding citizen to sell drugs, see People v. Crawford, 372 N.W.2d 550,
553 (Mich. App. 1985) (“[M]ere requests to sell contraband, even repeated request,
are not conduct likely, when objectively considered, to induce the commission of the
crime by a person not ready and willing to commit it.”).
189
See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE
UNITED STATES 2001, 220 (2002).
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criminals. The fairness principle is a principle of justice. Justice,
however, need not be conceived in absolutist terms as a value carrying
infinite weight. With due deference to Kant,190 to refuse to commit the
slightest injustice in order, say, to alleviate the suffering of mankind
bespeaks a lack of perspective. While principles of justice may be
reformulated and qualified to preserve their formal superiority over
considerations of welfare, some degree of accommodation with other
values, however that accommodation is conceptualized, must be
admitted. Entrapping and convicting a high percentage of the
population through a widespread campaign of entrapment (without any
mitigation of penalties), while eliminating fairness, is not a realistic
option for society. Likewise, abandoning standard reactive crime
detection practices, such as police patrols, while also eliminating
unfairness, is not a realistic option for society. Such practices are
necessary if crime is to be deterred and society protected. In contrast,
entrapment, although a cost-effective means of preventing crime,191 is
not a necessary means. Other techniques more consistent with the
demands of fairness, including undercover investigation and
encouragement not amounting to entrapment, will suffice to achieve a
reasonable level of crime control. Thus, not only is the injustice of
entrapment relatively severe, it is also relatively lacking in justification.
A third, and perhaps the most important, distinction between
entrapment and other law-enforcement activities, such as opportunity
providing, is that entrapment is a practice that is unfair by design. Both
entrapment and other police enforcement activities distribute burdens
disproportionately to varying degrees. The goal of other forms of
police activity, however, is to be as effective and far-ranging as
possible. Although it may be arbitrary which streets the police choose
to patrol, and so which burglars are arrested, the police would patrol all
the streets and apprehend all burglars if they could. Burglars both
deserve to be punished and their incarceration would prevent them
from committing further crimes. Likewise, while it may be arbitrary
which drug dealers are caught by a police sting operation which
provides opportunities for crime, such operations are designed to
apprehend as many drug dealers as possible and it is regrettable that
190

Cf. IMMANUEL KANT, METAPHYSICAL FIRST PRINCIPLES OF THE DOCTRINE OF
RIGHT, in THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 141 (Mary Gregor trans., 1991) ("if justice
goes, there is no longer any value in men's living on the earth.").
191
See supra §§ III.b.2-4.

ANTHONY M. DILLOF

69

through such operations not all drug dealers are apprehended. For this
reason, the unfairness of these practices is analogous to the unjustness
of other aspects of the criminal justice system. Persons who are not
liable are sometimes convicted. Although convicting such persons is
unjust, it is merely a regrettable, and not a fatal, feature of the criminal
adjudication system. In contrast, an adjudication system designed with
the purpose of convicting those not liable would be deeply disturbing.
The moral distinction between wrongs done by design and those that
are merely unavoidable side effects has a long and respected lineage.192
Like an adjudication system designed to convict the innocent, the
practice of entrapment breaches the norms of justice by design. Even if
it were feasible to entrap widely enough to spread equitably the burden
of conviction among the nonpredisposed, it would not be desirable. As
discussed, entrapment is justified as a general deterrent. It is thus
inherently a matter of using the few as examples for the many. If many
were to be entrapped through a wide-spread and ongoing campaign of
entrapment, it would demonstrate entrapment’s failure to deter, rather
than its success. Furthermore, as discussed above, entrapping and
imposing significant penalties through a wide-spread campaign of
entrapment is not a realistic option for society. Because the practice of
entrapment is designed to burden the few from the many who
potentially benefit from it, it violates the fairness principle.
3. Specific Counter-Examples
This section looks at specific police activities that may seem to
violate the fairness principle. The validity of these activities might
appear to imply that the fairness principle is overbroad and should be
rejected.
192

This distinction is frequently referred to as the Doctrine of Double Effect, and
usually traced back to Thomas Aquinas.
See THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA
THEOLOGICA, II-II, Q. 64, art. 7 (Marcus Lefebure ed., Blackfriars 1975). A typical
example illustrating the operation of this doctrine is that it is morally permissible to
bomb a munitions factory to hasten the end of a war, even if it is foreseen that
civilians will inevitably be killed by errant bombs. It is not, however, morally
permissible to drop bombs on civilians in order to hasten the end of the war by
breaking the morale of the enemy. See Gerald Dworkin, Intention, Foreseeability,
and Responsibility, in RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER AND THE EMOTIONS 338, 339
(Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987); Warren S. Quinn, Actions, Intentions, and
Consequences: The Doctrine of Double Effect, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF., 334, 334 n.3
(1989).
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a. Speeding–It is a common practice for the police to stop only a
very small percentage of motorists who drive above the speed limit.
General deterrence is the principal justification of the practice. As with
entrapment, the police do not desire to ticket all speeders. Can be those
stopped complain of unfairness?
Two considerations mitigate the prima facie unfairness of the
practice. First, police in fact do not usually swoop down on an
arbitrary speeder and ticket her. Common experience indicates that the
great majority of highway speeders exceed the speed limit by less than
25%. These drivers do not pose a substantial risk because their speed is
relatively near the limit. Furthermore, because a substantial number of
drivers drive in this range, each individual driver, traveling with the
pace of traffic generally, is not increasing the risk nearly as much as if
only a few exceeded the speed limit. In light of these facts, the
common practice of patrol officers is to stop only those who speed
“excessively.” Their choice is not arbitrary, but limited to a group,
reckless speeders, whom the police would like to apprehend generally.
In contrast, the police would not like to apprehend generally those
persons targeted for entrapment. Second, the penalty associated with
speeding violations is de minimis compared to the penal sanctions
associated with the crimes the entrapment defense normally applies to.
Any unfairness is mitigated proportionately. If the police randomly
pulled over one among many drivers traveling 5-10 miles over the
speed limit on a state highway and, as a result, significant penalties
were imposed, the practice would become intuitively objectionable.
b. Tax Audits–Another example of a “random” law enforcement
technique used primarily for deterrence is tax audits. These fall within
the category of necessary evils, that is, cases where the practice serves
some important social function and this function cannot be achieved
through a means that spreads the burden more equitably. It is
functionally impossible to inspect carefully the hundreds of millions of
tax returns filed each year. Maintaining compliance with the income
tax is an indispensable social goal.
Although most persons
undoubtedly now file their proper returns not based on the fear of being
audited, but because of their commitment and belief in the legitimacy
of the taxation scheme, wide-spread cheating would in time undermine
the perceived legitimacy of the scheme. If that tipping point is ever
reached, the income tax would have to be abandoned. Accordingly, in
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contrast to entrapment, some disproportional burdening of individuals
is necessary.
c. High-Profile Prosecutions–Finally, the not uncommon
prosecutorial practice of targeting high-profile or celebrity figures is
consistent with the fairness principle. Prosecutors have brought
charges against professional athletes, media personalities, and
politicians in cases where they may not have proceeded against
members of the general public.193 These decisions may be based on the
notion that, in terms of deterrence, such prosecutions provide “a bigger
bang for the buck.” A high-profile defendant might therefore claim
that she has been unfairly targeted, arguing that because others
arrestees would not have been prosecuted, or granted lighter sentences,
she is being made to shoulder a disproportionate burden of the cost of
crime prevention. This argument has an air of plausibility. Prosecutors
sometimes deny the premise that they treat defendants based on their
notoriety,194 likely concerned that otherwise the public may perceive
them as acting unfairly. Targeting high-profile figures for prosecution,
however, may be analogized to the progressive income tax. Requiring
all who earn a high income to pay a high tax is arguably consistent with
distributive justice because (a) there is a good reason why those who
193

See Vikram David Amar, The Many Ways to Prove Discrimination, 14
Hastings Women’s L. J. 171, 178 n.13. (2003) (noting that the Securities and
Exchange Commission uses high-profile prosecutions to ensure more general
compliance); Michael A. Simons, Prosecutorial Discretion and Prosecutorial
Guidelines, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 893, 964 n.281 (citing cases against sports figured
brought because of their deterrence value). See also Erin McClam, Martha Stewart
Guilty of All Counts, Chattanooga Times Free Press (Tennessee) March 6, 2004, at
A1 (describing conviction of Martha Stewart; noting her “supporters claim she was
being targeted because of her celebrity status.”); Harriet Chiang, Starr Would Find It
Difficult To Prove Perjury by Clinton, San Francisco Chronicle, Sept. 18 1998, at A5
(discussing perjury investigation of Bill Clinton; noting “when someone is charged
solely with perjury, it often involves a high_profile figure.”); Arianna Huffington,
O.J., Bill and the Perjury Plague, New York Post, July 21, 1998, at 25 (arguing to
deter perjury “it is so critical that the nation's two highest-profile alleged perjury
cases–those of O.J. Simpson and Bill Clinton–are pursued to their respective ends.”);
Mark Helm, Ex_Prosecutors Say Clinton Held to Tougher Standard; Perjury
Convictions Common, GOP Argues, Times_Picayune (New Orleans, LA) December
10, 1998, at A10.
194
See Reuters, Colo. Prosecutor Mulls Charges Against Kobe Bryant, (July 7, 2003)
("In deciding whether to file charges, the same standards apply to Mr. Bryant as apply
in every other sexual assault case," Hurlbert said. "I will treat this case just like I treat
any other sex assault case.").
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earn more should pay proportionately more, e.g., they can afford it, or
they have benefitted more from society; and (b) the policy is applied
generally across all members of a given high income bracket.
Likewise, targeting high-profile defendants can be justified based on a
greater-deterrence rationale where such a policy is applied consistently
to all high-profile defendants. As noted earlier, the fairness principle,
like any principle of justice, may admit different interpretations
consistent with its broad terms.195
Entrapment, however, may not be defended along these lines. As
a rule, the police do not attempt to entrap all members of a given group,
even if the group is defined narrowly, in a manner analogous to “high
income persons.” Consider the following, not atypical, case of
entrapment.
Ken is desperately in need of money. He
approaches Rocky, a confidential police
informant, for a loan. Rocky refuses, but
convinces Ken, who has no history of drug use,
to join a drug transaction. Ken and Rocky drive
to a highway intersection where they meet Willy,
an undercover police officer. Willy gives Ken
$300. Willy and Ken agree to meet later that
day to complete the transaction.
Ken
reluctantly accepts a bag containing 3 grams of
cocaine from Rocky. Rocky, Ken and Willy later
meet in a parking lot. When Ken gives Willy the
bag, he is arrested and charged with dealing in
cocaine. On appeal of his conviction, Ken is
found not to be predisposed as a matter of law
and exonerated based on the entrapment
defense.196
Many people like Ken are in desperate financial straits. Many
undoubtedly could be pressed against their better judgment into playing
an insignificant role in a minor drug transaction. The police have no
general interest in entrapping all such persons. Ken, although having
no history of drug use, admittedly had some contact with unsavory
195
196

facts).

See supra text accompanying note 95.
See Kats v. Indiana, 559 N.E.2d 348 (Ct. Apps. Ind. 1990) (presenting similar
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characters such as Rocky. This much might be inferred from Ken’s
approaching Rocky for a loan. Even if Ken’s class is defined even
more narrowly as “persons in financial need, short on prudence, and
familiar with unsavory characters,” it is doubtful the police were
operating according to a practice designed to entrap most of the
members of this class. Rather, they were only trying to entrap those
who had the misfortune of approaching Rocky. It no less offends
justice to entrap only the members of the “class” that happen to know
Rocky than it would be to impose a particularly high tax on those with
high incomes who happened to know Rocky. Thus, the prima facie
validity of various law enforcement practices does not undermine the
fairness principle as an explanation for the unjustness of entrapment.
D. Doctrinal Implications
A theory of entrapment should explain the major contours of the
defense, such as the distinction between governmental and private
entrapment. The preceding sections have attempted to meet that goal.
A theory of entrapment ideally should also be able to recommend
solutions to open doctrinal issues. That is the work of this section.
1. Subjective v. Objective Theories
An open issue in the area of entrapment is the dispute between the
subjective and objective versions of the defense. As argued earlier,
most cases actually brought will come out the same way under either
version.197 For this reason, it was methodologically acceptable to
formulate a theory of entrapment without reference to the distinction
between the versions. Nevertheless, having developed and defended
the entrapment as unfairness theory, it is appropriate to inquire which
version of the defense is more consistent with it.
The inquiry should focus on those rare cases where the subjective
and objective versions produce different outcomes. These may be
referred to as cases of the objectively entrapped predisposed defendant.
For example:
Larry is a professional pickpocket. He owes
$100 dollars to a bookie and must pay the debt
the next day. Broke, he leaves his home late one
evening to go to a crowded bus terminal to ply
his trade. Larry has frequently been successful
197

See section II.C. supra.
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at the terminal, but on a number of occasions,
he has been arrested. Just outside of the
terminal, Larry sees a man lying on his side in a
fetal position with a paper bag containing a
beer bottle in one hand. The man is a police
officer feigning drunkenness as part of a decoy
operation. A wallet protrudes from the rear
pocket of his jeans. Bills sticking out of the
wallet can be easily seen. Larry walks by the
apparently helpless drunkard. He then turns
back and steals the wallet. Two officers
witnessing the theft spring from cover and
apprehend him. Larry is charged with theft.
If these events occurred in a jurisdiction following the subjective
version of the entrapment defense, Larry would be out of luck. While
he might be able to establish that he was induced to commit the theft,
the government likely would be able to carry its burden of proving that
Larry was predisposed. Larry needs money immediately. He has a
criminal record of engaging in similar crimes at the same location.
Larry did not hesitate in taking the wallet. In contrast, if these events
occurred in a jurisdiction following the objective version of the
entrapment defense, Larry would likely be able to avoid conviction.
Courts have held on similar facts that, as a matter of law, the drunk
decoy operation created a substantial risk that theft would be
committed by persons other than those ready to commit it, thereby
satisfying the requirements of the objective test.198 On these facts, does
the fairness principle permit conviction consistent with the objective
version or require exoneration consistent with the subjective version?
Arguments based on the fairness principle may be advanced in
support of either resolution. On one hand, Larry can claim he has been
treated unfairly because he has been subjected to an unfair police
practice. Using decoys is unfair because it typically results in the
apprehension of an arbitrary member of a large, generally law-abiding
class that the police have no wish or intent to prosecute generally. On
198

See Hawaii v. Powell, 68 P.2d 266 (1986). See also Cruz v. Florida, 465
So.2d 516 (1985) (use of drunk decoy satisfies objective test as matter of law);
Sheriff, Washoe County v. Hawkins, 752 P.2d 769 (Nevada 1988) (same). But see
People v. Walker, 615 P.2d 57 Colorado 1980) (rejecting entrapment defense on
similar facts).
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the other hand, the government can argue that it is fair to convict Larry
because it would, if it could, convict all similarly predisposed
pickpockets. The dilemma here is one manifestation of the general
problem of how the law should treat parties, such as the police, that
have acted in a manner that is objectionable in theory, but which, due to
unforeseen circumstances, results in an otherwise acceptable outcome,
such as the apprehension of a predisposed defendant.199
A reasonably close analogy is presented by “after-acquired
evidence” cases that arise in the employment law context. In the
typical after-acquired evidence case, a member of a minority group is
fired from a job and sues. In the course of litigation, the plaintiff is
able to establish that he was fired based on unlawful discriminatory
grounds, but evidence is also discovered that shows that he committed
predischarge conduct that would have justified his firing in the first
place. The minority member can claim he was subjected to an unfair
practice (discriminatory discharge) and the employer can claim that the
firing of an employee who engaged in misconduct is not unfair. Courts
have resolved after-acquired evidence cases, holding that the employer
may proceed in the light of the newly acquired evidence to deny
reinstatement and deny damages from the point where the evidence was
acquired.200 Any other conclusion would be “inequitable.”201
There seems no reason why the dispute concerning the
objectively entrapped predisposed defendants should be resolved
differently than one concerning wayward employees who have suffered
discrimination. Applying this principle to entrapment, the predisposed
defendant should be convicted despite the fact that he happened to be
199

This also problem arises in the context of persons who engage in conduct
prohibited according to an offense definition, unaware that they are doing so under
circumstances that would uncontroversially establish a justification defense if they
were aware of them. Known as the problem of “unknowing justification,”this issue
has attracted the attention of a number of criminal law theorists, including the Author.
See e.g. Anthony M. Dillof, Unraveling Unknowing Justification, 77 Notre Dame L.
Rev. 1547 (2002); Russell L. Christopher, Unknowing Justification and the Logical
Necessity of the Dadson Principle in Self-Defense, 15 OXFORD J. LEG. STUDIES 228
(1995); Paul Robinson, Competing Theories of Justification: Deeds v. Reasons, in
HARM AND CULPABILITY 45 (A.P. Simester and A.T.H. Smith, 1996); Robert F.
Schopp, Justification Defenses and Just Convictions, 24 PAC. L.J. 1233, 1267-82
(1993).
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See McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 362 (1995).
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ensnared in a practice which, as a general matter, produces unfair
results.202 It is not unfair to convict persons like Larry because the
government would, if it could, convict all the members of his class
(predisposed pickpockets). The government, we might say, is not
acting unfairly to him in prosecuting. This point may be more clear if
we imagine the less likely scenario that the government is aware that
Larry is on his way to the bus terminal to pick a pocket, but for various
reasons decides it would be preferable to catch Larry through the use of
a decoy that might ensnare even a generally law-abiding citizen. Such
a tactic, it is submitted, is not intuitively objectionable.
The case for the subjective version of entrapment, however, is not
open and shut. A prophylactic argument can be made for the objective
version of the defense. Under the subjective version, a defendant must
be acquitted unless it can be demonstrated that he was predisposed. It
might be thought that juries will be overly eager to find predisposition
in the face of actual criminal conduct and so fail to acquit a
nonpredisposed person pursuant to the entrapment defense. The
objective version of the defense would eliminate such instances of
erroneous conviction. If the number of these erroneous convictions is
expected to be greater than the relatively few number of cases where
the objective and subjective versions diverge, these convictions can be
eliminated at a relatively low cost. The adoption of the objective
version of entrapment, though overbroad, would then be defensible.
2. Positional Predisposition
A second doctrinal conflict lies within the ranks of adherents to
the subjective version of entrapment. Courts in subjective jurisdictions
are split on the meaning of “predisposition.” Generally speaking, under
the subjective approach, where a defendant has been induced to commit
a crime, he is entitled to an entrapment defense unless the government
can establish that he was predisposed to commit the offense. But
202

Design aside, in cases of objectively entrapped predisposed defendants, the
disproportionality of the burden is not as great as in the cases of nonpredisposed
defendants. First, there are many more nonpredisposed to crime than predisposed.
Second, among this larger group, there are many fewer who potentially bear the
burden of conviction. Among the nonpredisposed, this lesser group is only those who
have been exposed to usually high inducements. In contrast, many of the predisposed
will commit crimes and be apprehended, either as result of inducements not rising to
entrapment or through the usual mechanism of police apprehension after commission
of the crime. Consequently, the relative percentage of nonpredisposed potentially
burdened by entrapment is much less than that of the predisposed.
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exactly what is it to be predisposed? The Ninth Circuit has concluded
that a “predisposition” refers to a mental state or a characterological
propensity, roughly equal to being ready and to commit the crime
should an opportunity present itself.203 In contrast, the Seventh Circuit,
in an opinion by Judge Posner, and the Fifth Circuit, have taken the
position that “predisposition” includes a positional component.204
Under this interpretation of predisposition, a defendant would only be
predisposed if, absent government involvement, he both was ready and
willing to commit the crime (the mental component) and was so
positioned that he would likely have committed it (the positional
component).
An example offered by Judge Posner nicely illustrates the added
requirement of the positional interpretation. Posner writes:
Suppose the government went to someone and
asked him whether he would like to make
money as a counterfeiter, and the reply was,
"Sure, but I don't know anything about
counterfeiting." Suppose the government then
bought him a printer, paper, and ink, showed
him how to make the counterfeit money, hired
a staff for him, and got everything set up so
that all he had to do was press a button to print
the money; and then offered him $10,000 for
some quantity of counterfeit bills.205
The individual approached by the government clearly possessed the
mental state sufficient to be found predisposed; when presented with
the opportunity, he seized it with little prompting. The individual,
however, was not positionally predisposed because, absent the
involvement of a government agent, it is doubtful he ever would have
been in a position to move from his desire to counterfeit to actual
counterfeiting. In light of this fact, should the individual be considered
“predisposed” for the purpose of the subjective version of the

203

See United States v. Thicksun, 110 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997).
See United States v. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d 1196 (7th Cir. 1994); U.S. v.
Knox, 112 F.3d 802, 808 (5th Cir. 1997) (agreeing with Hollingsworth).
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entrapment defense? The Supreme Court has yet to address the
issue.206
The fairness theory of entrapment would support the requirement
of a positional component to predisposition. It would thus favor
extending the defense to those who would likely never have been in a
position to have committed the charged offense absent the
government’s providing that opportunity even if they were otherwise
willing to commit the offense. Under the fairness theory, willingness to
commit an offense is not, in itself, a decisive factor permitting
entrapment and conviction. Many “law-abiding” people, under the
appropriate circumstances might be willing to commit a crime,
particularly one without an identifiable victim. It is fair to speculate
that many people, for example, might trade on insider information if
they believed the chances of detection were minimal and the financial
gain realized, or loss to be avoided, was sizable. For the government to
arbitrarily select and entrap one among many such persons would be
unfair. Rather, under the fairness theory, the critical factor is the
likelihood, all things considered, that the person would commit the
offense. If a person is likely to commit a crime, then entrapping and
convicting those like him to protect the public is a course of action the
government would like to engage in generally. Although the
government in fact may not be able to do so, this limitation no more
renders the practice unacceptable than other social institutions which in
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In United States v. Jacobson, 503 U.S.540 (1992), the Court’s most recent
entrapment case, the Court stated, “When the Government’s quest for conviction
leads to the apprehension of an otherwise law-abiding citizen who, if left to his own
devices, likely would never have run afoul of the law, the courts should intervene.”
Id. at 553-54. Literally construed, this statement is broad enough to admit a
positional component. The facts of Jacobson, however, do not require such an
interpretation. The court concluded that Jacobson was not predisposed. There was no
showing, however, that child pornography was otherwise unavailable over the
Internet or otherwise. Rather, the Court emphasized the government’s role in piquing
and legitimating Jacobson’s interest in child pornography–implying that Jacobs
lacked the mental component of predisposition. Furthermore, language in older
Supreme Court opinions stresses that the purpose of the entrapment defense is to
protect the “unwary innocent.” See United States v. Sorrells, 287 U.S. 435, 451
(1932). This language is inconsistent with the positional interpretation. It is difficult
to describe persons who desire to commit crimes, such as the individual in Posner’s
hypothetical, as innocent.
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practice fail to consistently achieve the ideals they were designed to
achieve.207
A similar analysis applies to the question whether a person should
be considered predisposed if he has a substantial desire or inclination to
engage in the criminal conduct at issue, but that desire or inclination is
kept in check by a stronger appositional one. For example, imagine
Frank, a person who has always dreamed of being a counterfeiter, and
has access to all the necessary equipment. Frank, however, also has an
overriding fear of being apprehended for counterfeiting. Accordingly,
Frank foregoes the opportunity to counterfeit until he is approached by
undercover agents who convince him that he can proceed without
detection. Should we say that Frank was predisposed and thus not
entitled to the entrapment defense?208 The fairness theory would reject
this result. From the perspective of fairness, Frank is in the same
position as the individual in Posner, hypothetical. While both have a
desire to engage in crime, without government involvement it is
unlikely that either would have. The government is not interested in
apprehending all of those held in check based on fear of apprehension
or other defeasible psychological constraints on criminal desires. Even
though he has a desire to be a counterfeiter, it is unfair to make him the
target of a practice that is designed to use the few for the benefit of the
many.
Summary and Conclusion
The norms of justice constrain governmental efforts to advance
the common good. Retributive justice requires that an actor be morally
culpable for causing or risking harm to another before the state may
disadvantage the actor in a significant and stigmatizing way.
Distributive justice requires that the benefit and burdens of the joint
enterprise of society be appropriately shared among its members. This
Article has urged that the domains of these two sets of norms are not
mutually exclusive, one beginning where the other leaves off. Rather
they may overlap in various contexts, operating in a simultaneous and
complementary fashion to restrain the state.
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See text accompany note 193 supra.
This issue is raised in Jacobson v. United States, where the dissent argued that
the Court’s finding that Jacobson had a predisposition to view photographs of preteen
sex should, without more, defeat Jacobson’s entrapment claim. Id. at 559.
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Case in point is entrapment. In order to justly punish persons
who have been entrapped, it must be that they are culpable for their
unlawful acts. This Article has argued that they are, even in cases
where they have faced temptations that even a reasonable person might
yield to. There is no excuse for freely choosing to do wrong. Even
though reasonable persons cannot be blamed for their limited resistance
to temptation, they can be blamed when those limits are exceeded and
wrongdoing results. Rather than foundering on norms of retributive
justice, entrapment founders on the norms of distributive justice. Most
persons entrapped within the legal definition of entrapment are
nonpredisposed to crime, and so are not dangerous enough to justify
entrapping pursuant to a general practice.
From a utilitarian
perspective, entrapment is justified not because it incapacitates, but
because it can deter generally. Deterrence however is inherently a
matter of using few for the benefit of the many who might otherwise be
victims of crimes or subjects of criminal sanctions. Entrapping the
many would make no sense. Thus, entrapment, as a practice, is
designed to disadvantage only a limited number of the population who
are similarly situated with respect to dangerousness, deterrent value,
and other relevant features. In this respect, entrapment is similar to the
conversion of an arbitrarily selected person’s home to a police station
for the benefit of the community as a whole. The goal of crime
prevention is advanced, but the cost is not properly shared over the
relevant class. This is unfair to the person entrapped. The defense of
entrapment exists to prevent exactly such unfairness.
Conceiving of the entrapment defense as a response to the
problem of unfairness unravels one of the core puzzles of the
entrapment defense: why it is limited to cases where a government
agent, rather than a private party, encourages the defendant. A person
is neither more responsible nor more dangerous if, unbeknownst to
him, his tempter worked for the government. Indeed, the deterrent
effect of convicting a person entrapped by the government might be
greater than if inducer were a private party. Convicting a person
governmentally entrapped demonstrates the state’s commitment to
aggressively rooting out potential criminals and punishing the culpable.
Nor does government entrapment present a significant threat to civil
rights. A government intent on suppressing dissent has many more
practical means than entrapment, and the defense of entrapment is not
the only means to avoid conviction in such cases. The key to the
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governmental/private inducer distinction is the agent-relative nature of
the fairness principle. Fairness bars the state from arbitrarily selecting
a class member for burdening, while the state may impose burdens
based on the arbitrary selection of a class member by others. In this
respect, fairness is like other principles of justice, such as corrective
justice, which requires the correcting of only the wrongs imposed by
the agent, while allowing wrongs imposed by others to be disregarded.
Explicating the entrapment defense in terms of unfairness
suggests directions for the entrapment doctrine to develop. However,
regardless whether these suggestions are adopted, bringing to bear
considerations of moral and political philosophy, as well as insights
and analogies from other areas of law, serves to better mark the
defense’s present position and to illuminate its future path. If criminal
law does not look outward, beyond its scholastic boundaries, if it does
not look deeper, beneath its case law articulation, then criminal law is
fated to become entrapped in its own doctrinal mazes.

